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This project outlines the assumpt ions of three schools of
theory about ethnic conflict and relates them-to the
specific example of Kurdish et hno nationalist violence.
The
first school,
the conflictual m o d e r n i z a t i o n i s t s , blames the
social changes and economic c omp eti ti on of mo de r n i z a t i o n for
the creation and strengthening of ethnic ties.
A c c o rd in g to
'them, ethnic conflict results from modernization.
The
second school, the p r i m o r d i a l i s t s , portrays ethnic
identifiers as traits that supersede economic ties.
For
them, ethnicity and ethnic org anization are a natural, p r e 
mo de rn system' of diffe ren ti ati on betw een competing human
groups.
They believe that conflict results from d ee pl y felt
loyalties to pr e-modern identities.
These two schools have
do mi nat ed the debate over the causes of ethnic conflict.
However, the third school analyze d in this project,
the constructivists, best describes the conditions that
have resulted in Kurdish ethnonationalism.
The
constructivists believe that ethnic ity and n a t i on al is m
are imagined identities, and that the ideologies of
ethnicity and na tionality are di scourses that reinforce
the legitimacy of or call for the de struction of
states.
A c co rd in g to the constructivists, a state that
claims legitimacy base d upon an et hnically homogenous
citizenry promotes one ethnic ide ntity as that;of the
nation-state.
When the national identity excludes
other ethnies wi thin the state's borders, excluded
.groups resist assimilation, resulting in conflict
between the excluded ethny and the state.
The example of Kurdish et hn on at io na li sm exposes the
weaknesses of the dominant ap proaches and the value of
constructivism.
Thus, future scholars must apply
constructivist considerations to their studies of
ethnic conflicts.
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CHA PT ER I
INTRODUCTION

The issue of ethnic conflict strikes at the heart of
most nation-states.
that,

A recent study of et hn i ci ty indicated

while there were only 165 states prio r to the breakup

of the Soviet Union,

there are as many as eight thousand

distinct ethnic groups in the w o r l d . 1

With so ma n y

ethnicities scattered throughout so few states,

few so-

called nation-states qualify even roughly as ethnic
nat io ns .2

These eth nic all y heterogenous states provide the

conditions

for ethnic competition or,

In multi- et hni c states,

even,

violence.

leaders often po liticize ethnic

identity and promote competition along ethnic lines,
difficulties for these states.

causing

Ethnic conflicts manifest

themselves in international complications and domestic
crises.

Foreign governments

intervene on the behalf of

1James Mayall, N a t i on al i sm and International Society
(Cambridge: Cambridge Uni versity Press, 1991), 64.
The
study based ethnic div er si ty upon linguistic and cultural
differentiation.
2In 1972, W al ke r Connor estimated that only 12 of 132
con te mporary states could claim an et hn ica ll y homogenous
citizenry.
Wa lker Connor, "Nation-building or Nationdestroying?"
World Politics 24 (April 1972): 320.

1

minorities or sponsor terrorist groups that organize around
ethnic identity.
sometimes
conflict.

Additionally,

imposes sanctions on states experiencing ethnic
Strong ethnic movements often accompany

intolerance and violence,
order.

the international community

th re ate nin g economic and political

Ethnic conflicts undermine the state at mu lti ple

levels to undermine international
democracy,

standing,

domestic order,

and legitim ac y.3

Studies show that ethnic conflict is the most
persistent and problematical
world.

Istvan Kende,

studying 120 violent conflicts

Af rica from 1946 to 1976,
of potential, conflict,
tribal,

in

conclu de d that of the three types

internal anti-regime,

and border wars,

frequent and deadly.

form of violence in the modern

internal

internal conflicts were the most

Most of the internal anti-regime and

all of the internal tribal conflicts involved groups
di f fe re nti at ed by ethnic ide nt it y. 4
In recognition of the w o r ld -w id e importance and the
complexity of ethnic violence,

numerous authors have

3Rita Jalali and Seymour M ar ti n Lipset, "Racial a n d
Ethnic Conflict," Political Science Quarte rl y 107 (Winter
1992): 586-87.
\

4Istvan Kende, “Wars of ten y e a r s , ” Journal of Peace
Research 15 (1978): 231-32. in T. David Mason, “Ethnicity
and Politics,” Encyclopedia of Gov ernment and Politics vol
1, Ma r y Hawkesworth and Maurice Kogan, e d s . (New York:
Routledge, 1992): 570.

attempted to un de rst an d this problem.

Several schools of

ethnic conflict addre sse d the issue of persistent violence
between groups organi ze d along ethnic lines or between such
groups and their respective states.

Even until the 1960's,

theorists assumed that mod er n iz at io n and economic
interdependence wo u l d erode the pre- mo der n ties to
ethnicity.

These Marxist

and Liberal

integrating modernizationists,

theorists,

the

ex pec te d the demise of

ethnicity as a means of political o rg ani za tio n and the end
of ethnic conflict.
When the integrating modernizationists'

predictions

failed to come true by the end of the 1960's,

scholars quit

assuming that ethnic conflict wou ld decrease,

and they tried

to discover the causes of violent ethnic conflict.

Three

schools of theory have arisen to examine the phe nom en on of
ethnic conflict.

The first of these schools,

conflictual modernizationists,

the

argues that the economic

competition and social di sr uption of mo de rni zat io n increases
ethnic conflict.

The second school,

the primordialists,

argues that ethnic conflict results from the assertion of
and the defense of ps y ch ol o gi ca ll y- va lu ed identities.
third school,

the constructivists,

The'

argues that ethnic

conflict results from the construction of national
identities that exclude ethnic groups withi n the states.

The purpose of this project is to examine the
different schools of ethnic conflict and the relevance-of
their theories to a specific example of persistent,

violent

ethnic conflict-- Kurdish et hno na t io na li sm in Iran,

Iraq,

and Turkey.
different

Chapters

II,

III,

IV,

and V review the

schools of ethnic conflict.

Chapters VI and VII

discuss Kurdish ethnonationalism.
Chapter II begins the review with a d i s cu ss io n of the
Marxist approach to ethnic conflict and the competition
theories that d ev el ope d from Marxist

ideas.

Thes e theorists

port ra y ethnic conflict as a reflection of the class
conflict.

Whereas Marxists assume that loyalties to archaic

ethnic ties would fade with modernization,

competition

theorists believe th at the increased ec onomic co mpetition of
mo d er niz at ion results in ethnic conflict.
a cultural division of labor,
ethnic lines,

They believe that

with class lines app rox im ati ng

causes violence between ethnies.

these mono cau sa l theories fail to address

However,

important

issues,

such as w h y ethnic groups choose to organize by ethnicity
rather than class.

Other,

more complex theories of the

relationship bet wee n mo de rni za tio n and ethnic conflict arose
to address their shortcomings.
Chapter III discusses the other conflictual
modernizationists.

They argue that m o de rn i za ti on radically

alters societies.

It destroys traditi ona l social structures

and replaces them with mo der n economies and exp an ded
polities.

As the people within colonies and new states that

are mod er niz ing try to organize their society,

ethnic elites

utilize ethnic identities for their own economic advantage,
and promote ethnic conflict.
The so phisticated conflictual mo de rni za tio n theorists
addressed m a n y issues .ignored by the Marxists and the
competition theorists,

but they lacked explanations for the

apparent irrationality of ethnic conflict.

Co nflicting

ethnic groups destroyed the economies and the polities along
with the mat eri al goods over whi ch conflictual
mo de rni za tio nis ts assumed they were fighting.

Furthermore,

members of- ethnic movements wi lli ng ly sacrificed not only
their economic well-being,
identity.

but their lives for their ethnic

The destructiveness,

deadliness,

and apparent

ir rationality of ethnic conflict defies the material,
rational assumptions of these theorists.
The primordialists,

whose theories are discu sse d in

chapter IV,

emphasize the "irrational" elements of ethnic

ident ity .5

Primordialists examine the psychological value.

5This project uses the term "irrational" to refer to
nonmaterial, non-political, personal needs (as opp ose d to
tangible material resources or politi cal power assumed to be
the "rational" goals of modern p e o p l e ) . As shall be
discussed, m o d e r n nation-states rely heavily upon

6
and emotional m ea nin g of ethnicity.

They argue that people

draw a sense of wort h and b el ong in g from their ethnic
identity.

Furthermore,

unlike class me m be rs hi p which

the oretically can be changed,

eth ni ci t y is an identity which

people have for their entire lives and pass on to their
descendants.

Thus,

they will sacrifice their immediate

economic interests for their ethnic group.
At the present time,

the conflictual mod er niz at ion ist

and the primordia li st approaches dominat e discussions of
ethnic c o n f li c t. 6
constructivists,

Ch a p t e r V examines a third school,

the

which has arisen re cently and examines the

"irrational" loyalties for their popu la r legitimacy.
Likewise, modern peopl e have an "irrational" need to belong
to a understandable order.
This te rm is included to
demonstrate that conflictual modernizationists' definitions
of "modern" and "rational" inherently denigrate "irrational"
behaviors which. are necessary to societies.
The term
"irrational" is not intended to denote inferiority or
dys fu nc t io na li sm and any confusion caused by its use is
unintended.
6Saul Newman, “Does Mod er ni za ti on Breed Ethnic
Co nf lic t?” Wo r ld Politics 43 (April 1991): 451-78. argues
for the inclusion of pri mordialist considerations in^ the
moderni za tio ni st discussions of ethnic conflict.
Paul R.
Brass, Ethnicity and Na ti on al is m (London: Sage Publications,
1991). covers both the conflictual m od er niz at ion ist approach
and the primord ial ist approach on these issues at an
international approach to ethnic violence.
See espe cia ll y
pages 69-75.
M ilt on J. Esman and Itamar Rabinovich, “The
Study of Ethnic Politics in the Mi dd le Eas t, ” in Ethnicity.
Fluralism.r......an.d...-thd S t ate
, eds. M ilt on j.
Esman and Itamar Rabinovich (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
Uni versity Press, 1988), 3-24. takes a regional approach
to ethnic conflict and includes the conflictual
modern iz ati on ist s and the primordialists.

relationship of ethnic identity to the process of
“con st ru ct in g” national identities.

Con st ruc tiv is ts argue

that ethnicity and nationa lit y are imagined identities.
They explain e thn ic ity as a argument at ive discou rse that
legitimizes or delegitim ize s the state.
Co ns tructivists

find the roots of ethnic vi ole nc e in

the promotion of national

identities that threaten other

identities within the state.
often,

Co nstructivists argue that,

the ethnic group that controls the state promotes its

ethnic identity as the national

identity,

ethnicities from the national community.

and excludes other
Since a state's

claim to le gitimacy often rests upon its claim of a
cul turally homogenous citizenry,
identities as a threat.

Ex clu de d ethnic groups resist what

they perceive as oppression,
through violence,

it perceives alternate

and states de fend themselves

promoting conflict along ethnic lines.

Chapter VI discusses the Kurdish people
and Turkey,

in Iran,

Iraq

and the hist or y of Kurdish ethnonationalism.

Kurdish leaders,

in the name of the Kurdish people,

have

fought the central governments of these states since their
formations.

In Iran and Iraq,

Kurdish groups have de manded

cultural autono my from the governments.

In Turkey,

Kurdish

eth nonationalists have fought for cultural rights and even a
separate state for K u r d i s h - s p e a k e r s .

Vi ole nc e between

ethnic Kurds and their respective governments have flared up
as recently as the Iran-Iraq War and the Gulf War.

The armed

conflict continues as the de cl a rat ion of the Kurdish
Federated State in Iraq has d e s t a bi l iz ed the region.
Chapter VII examines how well each of the ma jor schools
of ethnic conflict describes the conditions

in Kurdistan.

This project argues that whi le the two dominant schools,

the

conflictual m od er ni zat io nis ts a nd the primordialists,
provide insight into the forces that exacerbate the
conflict,

the construc tiv is ts best de scribe the causes of

Kurdish nationalism.

Kurdish nat ionalists rely upon the

traditional structures of aut ho ri ty that remain largely
intact.

Also,

they resisted the central authorities prior

to modernization.

Thus, m o d e r n iz at io n did not destroy

social order among the Kurds and did not cause ethnic
conflict.
Furthermore,
identities,

pr o p o s e d by pr imo rd ial is ts as the source of

ethnic conflict,
The Kurds,

the existence of ps yc ho lo gi ca ll y- va lu e d

does not necessitate interethnic violence.

Persians,

cultural identities.
does not,

in itself,

For example,

Arabs,

and Turks have we lf -de ve lop ed

However,

attachment to one's identity

require conflict with other groups.

an aff inity for one's

require animosity towards others'

"Turkishness" does not
" K u r d i s h n e s s ."

Primordialists mi sin t er pr et the origins of ethnic conflict
in Kurdistan.
The constructivist theory identifies the source of
violence between the Kurds and their ethnic neighbors.

The

root of the pr ob lem lies in the national self-perceptions of
the Kurdish nationalists and the leaders of Iran,
Turkey.

Al th o ug h economic forces,

Iraq and

social dis ru pt io n and

we l l- es ta bl i sh ed ethnic identities exacerbate the ethnic
conflict,

the unifying mecha ni sms of the three so-called

"natio n- sta te s"—
unity,

Iran's suppression of threats to Islamic

Iraq's Ba'thist's aspirations to lead Ar ab

n ati ona li sm and Turkey's insistence that the Kurds are
"mountain T u r k s " —

necessitate conflict.

Their pr esumed

"unifying mechanisms" are dys functional and must be
m o de ra te d or ethnic violence will continue.
Since the example of Kurdish et hn on at io na li s m reveals
the weaknesses of the dominant schools and shows the value
of constructivism,

future studies of ethnic conflict must

account for co ns tructivist assumptions.

Scholars should

quit focusing on the effects of m od er niz at ion or the
residual effects of loyalties to pre- mod ern ties for the
sources of ethnic conflict.

While these approaches enhance

the understanding of conflicts,

the problem ati ca l

construction of national identities causes of conflicts.

C H A P T E R II
CO NFLICTUAL MODERNIZATION:

As recently as the 1960s,

CO MPE TI TIO N THEORISTS

theorists of et hnic conflict

assu med that mo der ni za ti on w o u l d reduce ethnic consciousness
and ethnic violence.

These integrating m od ern iz ati on ist s

pr ed ic te d that the pre -modern ties of e th nic it y w o u l d
recede,

replaced by ties to the m od er n state.

The

interdependence of modern economies and the social
structures of m ode rn polities wo ul d ov er wh el m ethnic it y as a
means for social organization.

Despite their optimism,

ethnic conflict continued in dev elo pi ng societies and-even
spread into the developed world.
By the 1960's, most theorists abando ned the idea that
"nation-building" wo uld replace ethnic loyalties with .
loyalties to the centra liz ed states.

Mo der ni za ti on and

economic interdependence seemed to intensify ethnic
differences.

Something was fundament al ly wr ong with the

dominant paradigm.
conflicts

Saul Newman writes,

increased in number and scope,

"as

(ethnic)

they were percei ved

as more than just stubborn- relics of a bygone e r a . " 1

’
-Newman,

454.
10

As

11
political science reeval uat ed the assumptions of
mod er ni za ti on theory,
conflict,

it re -ex am in ed the issue of ethnic

att emp ti ng to explain the rise in violence.

The co nflictual mod ern iz a ti on is ts p ic ked up where the
integrating mod er ni za ti on is t s had left o f f —

examining the

relationship of economic forces to ethnic upheavals.

They

decid ed that the causes of ethnic conflict could be found in
economic forces,

and that "the re lat ionship between

ethnicity and class constitutes a key to understanding
ethnic co n fl i ct s. "2
economies,

The changes a ss oci at ed with dev elo pi ng

ac cording to the conflictual modernizationists,

caused ethnic conflict.
The co mpetition theorists are the most s tr aig ht for war d
of the conflictual modernizationists.

Simply put,

competition theorists believe ethnic conflict is the result
of economic struggles.

They argue that moderniz ati on

increases the co mpetition for scarce resources,
housing,

and economic opportunities,

jobs,

causing conflict to

occur along "ethnic b ou n d a r i e s " 3 as citizens perceive that

2Pierre van den Berghe, "E thnicity and Class in
Highland P e r u , " in Ethnicity and Resource Competition ed.
Leo Depres (The Hague: Mo ut on Publishers, 1975), 71.
3Fredrik Barth, "Introduction", Ethnic Groups and
B o u n d a r i e s . ed. Fredrik Ba.rth (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969).,
.9-38.
B a r t h ’s term "ethnic boundary" emphasizes that the
important feature in ethnic it y is not the actual
phenological trait, but the per cep tio n of identity.
He

12
the ir.interests are linked to those of their ethnic kin.4
Competition occurs either' because of a cultural division of
labor,

according to the depen den cy subschool,

a split labor market,

or because of

according to the ec o log y subschool.

Competition th eory evolved from Ma rx is t principles.
M a r x bel i ev ed that the social di sr upt io n ca used by
capitalist modes of pr oduction creates di ss a ti sfa cti on and
revolutionary zeal.
ethnic lines,

However,

when class lines coincide with

organization and conflict occur along ethnic

lines rather than class lines.
theory,

Ac co r di ng to competition

ethnic collective action and competition, occur most

often when ethnically- distinct populat ion s are exploited.
M od ern iz ing societies'

increased competition for valuable

resources ignites ethnic action.
Economic co mp e ti ti on creates relative de pr a vi ty between
ethnies and the economic disparity leads to strife.

Ethnic

conflict in a society results from more than inequalities
and scarcity of resources.
Jeffrey Martin,

conflict

Acc or di ng to Cho ng-do Hah and

is most

likely when ethnic groups

assumes that ethnic boundaries are po li ti ca l ly an d socially
constructed, and can not be ob jec tiv el y determined.
"Ethnic
boundaries," thus, can be and are crossed, created, and r e 
created.
4Susan Olzak and Joane Nagel, "Introduction," in
Competitive Ethnic R e l a t i o n s , ed. Susan Olzak and Joane
Nagel (Boston: A c a d e m y Press, 1986), 2.

sense that what

is has is incongruous with

"the goods and

conditions they think they are capable of at tai nin g or
m a i n t a i n i n g ."5

Marxists
Karl M a r x was one of the early theorists to address the
issue of ethnic nationalism.

However,

nationalist sympathies as distractions
struggle.

Marx saw ethnic and
from the class

He p ort ra yed the economic forces of ca p it al is m as

forces' that would promote un ive r sa li sm over particularism.
Socia li sm wo u ld end ethnic tension and consciousness,
replacing pre -modern kinship loyalties with m ode rn class
loyalties.

Ethnicity,

as a relic of a by gone era,

wo ul d

disapp ea r during modernization.
Marx's e ur oce ntr is m resulted in his failure to
ant icipate the persistence of ethnic conflict.

Marx

acc ep ted state boundaries as co-extensive wi th the
boundaries of the societies and economies that he studied.
To Marx,

language and sympathies det erm in ed na ti on al it y or

ethnicity.
groups.

He saw the wo rld as clearly d el in ea ted national

Alt h ou gh re latively clear del ineations between

national groups descri bed conditions

in the Europe during

5Chong- do Hah and J e f f r e y Martin, "Towards a Synthesis
of Conflict and Integration Theories of Nationa lis m, " Wor ld
Politics 27 (April 1975): 373.

14
the pos t-F re nch - Re vo lu ti on era to some extent,

it did not

describe ethnic relations in the rest of the w o r l d . 6
M a r x ac cep ted nations as pr e-e x is ti ng

"givens" to

such an extent that he bel ie ved that the class struggle
wo uld occur along national lines.
M a n i f e s t o . he wr o te that:
must,

of course,

b ou rg eoi si e." 7

In the Communist

"The proletariat of each country

first of all settle matt ers with its own
His assumption of a national bourgeoisie

conflicts with his assumption of international revolution.
One can not assume international w or ke r un ity defined, in
material terms,

but organized along non-material,

national

lines.
To the extent that Marx p r e di ct ed the persistence of
ethnic nationalism,

it was as a tool of the ruling class to

distract the pro le tar iat
religion,

from the class struggle.

Like

ethnic na ti o nal ism was an integral part of the

superstructure of society that was created by the dominant
economic and political class to justify and legitimize its
rule.

It used ethnic and national identities to bind

together different classes through the creation of a false.

6Even in the era of the British, Habsburg, and Czarist
empires, map ma ker s and diplomats identified regions and
peoples wi thi n Europe with commonly acc ep ted terms.
7Karl Ma rx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist
M a n i f e s t o , in -the Sel ected W o r k s . 1,45 quoted in Benedict
Anderson, Imagined Communities (London: Verso, 1991), 4.

15
a concept of national interest that co ncealed horizontal
class divisions.
A c c or di ng to Marx,
conflict.

ethnic conflict is a m a s k for class

He wrote that ethnic prejudice is "a rtificially

kept alive and intensified by all the means at the disposal
of the ruling classes

(and)

is the secret of the impotence

of the English working cl as s." 8

He treated ethnic

nationalist discontent as a disguise for real ma terial
discontent and aspirations
sense,

ethnic conflict

aristocrats.

for class liberation.

In this

is more than just a tool of the

It is a symptom of a greater struggle.

Energies that wo u l d be chan nel le d into communist revolutions
fuel nationalist movements.
This

is not to say that Mar x. was wh ol ly negative about

the effects of ethni cit y upon the political realm.

Since

some ethnic conflicts could hasten the onset of a socialist
utopia,

Ma rx supported or repudiated specific nationalist

struggles a c c o r d i n g .to his det erm in ati on of wh et her their
success w o u l d advance the pr ol eta ria n revolution.

On the

one hand, Marx supported some instances of Irish
nationalism,

and,

on the other,-

chasti sed Boh emian and

8Karl Marx, “Letter to M e y e r and Vogt of 9 April 1870,”
in Hall Draper, Karl Marx's Theory of Re volution vol. 2 (New
York: Mo n t h l y Review Press, 1978), 237.

16
Croatian nationalists

for seeking freedom from Au str ia n

rul e. 9
Marx a ss um ed that n a t i o na li sm w o u l d fade with
modernization.

As economic compet iti on caused by capi tal is m

increased the hardship ex p er ien ced by the proletarians,
the revolutionary van gu ard ed uca te d them,

and

they would

recognize their material interests and be less susceptible
to appeals to archaic ethnic loyalties.
however,
Marxist

By the 1 9 6 0 's,

the advances of cap it al is m and the spread of
ideology in mod er ni zi ng societies had not reduced

the effectiveness of appeals to pre -m ode rn social ties.
Mar xists could no longer assume that mo der ni za ti on woul d end
ethnic c o n f l i c t .
Marxist theorists since M a r x have a dd res se d some of his
oversights concerning ethnic conflict.
is understandable that Marx,
century,

They argue that it

writi ng in the mid - ni ne te en th

un der est im ate d the appeal of ethnicity and

na tio nal is m among the wor kin g class.
Marxist Regis Debray,

A cco rdi ng to French

horizontal class divisions formed

later in histo ry than the cultural divisions of e th n i c i t y . 10

9Marx"s views on natio nal is m-a re s ca tt ere d throughout
his writings.
See Mayall, 161. and Jalali and Lipset, 593.
10Regis Debray,
New Left Review 105

"Marxism and the National Q u e s t i o n , "
(September-October 1977):25-41.
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Thus,

ethnicity persists at a deeper ps ychological

level and

demands greater subconscious loyalty from p e op le .11
Debray identifies a h is tor ic all y n ece ss ary link between
ethnic movements an d workers'

movements.

He sees ethnic and

national ties as essential elements of communist revolution:
"All modern histo ry demonstrates that prolet ari an
dictatorships have only taken root whe re they fused with a
national liberation struggle,
national i de nt it y." 12

or where they have defende d a

Revo lu tio nar y leaders can utilize the

strength of ethnic ties along with calls for proletarian
revolution to advance their cause.

Where they have

neglected to incorporate ethnic and nationalist
Debray blames this oversight

loyalties,

for their failure.

The enduring legacy of Marxist literature on ethnic
nationa li sm is its emphasis upon the ec onomic sources of
conflict.

The ec onomic upheavals of the conversions from

feudal societies to capitalist societies strained social
order.

Mar x m i s t a k e n l y be lie ved that the conflicts caused

by these strains w o u l d occur along class lines instead of
ethnic lines.

However,

later theorists p ur su ed his notion

that economic forces lay be hi nd ethnic and national
conflict.

u In this sense De bray agrees with Emile Durkheim.
12Ibid,

33.
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Mu ch academic research into ethnic conflict

supports

the case that economic competition between et hnic groups
results in conflict.

Te odor Shanin notes that the variables

usu all y ass ociated with economic class m ob i l i z a t i o n also
correlate with ethnic m o b i l i z a t i o n . 13
one's occupation,

Disple asu re with

dif ferential rates of urbanization,

geographic mobility,

educational opportunity,

and choice of

pro fession correlate with involvement in ethnic nationalist
movements.
John Markakis demonstrates how economic forces resulted
in conflict among ethnies

in E t hi o pi a. 14

The Amhara,

an

Amharigna-speaking,

pre do m in an tl y Christian, people of

Ab y ss in ai n descent,

dominate the economic and political

of the country.

life

During the reigns o f M e n e l i k and Haile

'Selassie, A mha ra elites conso lid at ed their rule over an
et hn ically heterogenous,

pre do m in an tl y M u s l i m p e a sa nt ry that

was expro pri ate d from the land.

As a result,

leftist

nationalists mov e me nt s arose among other ethnic groups.
Ethiopia's poorest province,

Tigray,

In

oppres se d ethnics

formed the T igr ay People'.s Liberation. Front.

Other groups

13Te od or Shanin, "Ethnicity in the Soviet U n i o n , "
Comparative Studies in Society and History 31 (July 1989):
415.
14John Markakis, "Nationalities and the state in
Ethiopia," Third Wo rl d Quart erl y 11 (October 1989): 118-30.
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included the Western Somali Li beration Front,
Abo Li beration Front,

the Somali and

and the Af ar Liberation F ro nt .15

Conditions for Co mpetition and Conflict
Competition theorists offer two models of the
conditions that cause the most ma rk ed ethnic conflict:
ecology and the depen de ncy models.
'proposes that different prices
groups explains persistent,

the

The ecology model

for labor between ethnic

severe ethnic c o n fl ic t. 16

When

one group undercuts the wages of another ethnic group,
higher-paid,

thr eatened group will seek to protect

adv antaged position.

the

its

Acc o rd in g to ecology theorists,

this

process of threat and defense explains ethnic conflict.
Depen de ncy theorists offer a model of a mo de rni ze d "core"
region and less-developed "periphery" re gi o ns .17

The ethnic

group at the rich core exploits the poorer perip her y
ethnies,

thereby raising ethnic tension between the core and

p e rip he ry groups.

15I b i d . , 124-25.
16Edna Bonacich, "A Theory of Ethnic Antagonism:
Split Labor Market," Am eri can Sociological Review 37
(October 1972): 547-559.

The

17Michael Hechter, Internal C ol on ia li s m (Berkeley,
California: Un iv er s it y of Cal ifo rn ia Press, 1974)
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Ecology Theory
The ecological theorists b orr ow their ideas from the
science of biology,
coexistence

whic h shows that species can pe acefully

(provided one does not pre y upon the other)

when

they do not depend upon the same sources of food to survive.
When,

however,

ecosystem,

mu lti pl e groups occupy the same niche in an

they are forced to compete.

Similarity,

not cultural differences,

interethnic conflict in ecol og y theory.

explains

"Niche overlap"

increases the lik eli ho od of conflict and forces a struggle
to the death,

or dis app ea ran ce in the case of an ethnic

identity.
when two or more in ter spersed groups are in fact in
at least partial competition within the same niche
one would expect one such group to dis place the
other, or an acc ommodation involving an increasing
compl im ent ar ity and in terdependence to d e v e l o p . 18
When .separate ethnies attempt to live in the same region,
gain the same housing,

and compete for the same jobs,

ecology theory contends that one must absorb or eliminate
the other.

Split Labor Markets
Ecology theorists vie w a split labor market,

one in

whic h members of different ethnic groups wh o s e price of

18Barth,

20.

21
labor di f f e r s 19 compete for the same jobs,
conflict.

as the source of

Split labor mar k et s- re fl ec t the ex istence of two

or more groups competing for the same niche.

"The more

alike are the occupational di st ri bu ti on of two groups,
greater the competition between t h e m . " 20
market

is the place,

A split

according to Edna Bonacich,

the

labor
where

"ethnic ant ago ni sm first g e r m i na te s. " 21
Several variables,

which diffe r between e thn ic groups,

determine the price of labor of the workers belong ing to an
ethnic group.

Price of labor is not simply wages,

a group's resources and motives.

For example,

but also

some groups

consist primarily of members who lack the e du ca tio n and job
skills to demand highe r wages.

Oth er groups consist

primarily of members willing to accept a lower standard of
living,

or for tune-seeking "sourjourners" that intend to

wo r k only to return home.
wages,

seek fewer rights,

Such groups will accept lower
and are less likely to organize.

19Bonacich, 549.
She describes a split labor market.
"To be split, a labor market must contain at least two
groups of workers whose price of l a b o r .differs for the same
work, or woul d differ if they did the same work."
20Michael T. Hannan, “The Dynamics of Ethnic Boundaries
in Mo de rn St a t e s ” in National Development and the Wor ld
S y s t e m , eds. John W. M e y e r and Mich ael T. Hannan (Chicago:
Univ er sit y of Chicago Press, 1979),_ 272-3.
21Bonacich,

549.
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Thus,

they present a lower price of labor to employers and

threaten h ig h er -p ri ce d grou ps. 22 .
These factors,

according to ecolo gy theory,

whe the r ethnic conflict
persistent.

determine

is likely to occur and be

Different ethnic groups' u su all y "have lived

relatively separately from one another are likely to have
developed different employment motiv es and levels of
resources," and,

thus,

different prices of labor.23

ethnies have the same price,
However,

if two

there is not a conflict.

it is more likely that one group will have a lower

cost of labor than the other and threaten its position.
When a pol it ic al ly powerful ethny feels that it is
threatened by another group under cu tti ng its wages,
two options.

it has

Its members m a y attempt e xc lus io nar y tactics

or attempt to develop a caste-system.

An ex clu sionary

movement tries to deny a threatening ethn y physical access,
"thereby pr eserving a non-split,
m a r k e t . ”24

higher pr iced labor

A second possible tactic is the creation of a

22Ibid., 548-553 for a det ai l ed disc us sio n of
Bonacich.'s formulas and consideration.
She is ma inly
concerned with immigrant ethnic groups, but also implies
that these same variables are active in other ethnic
relations.
23Ibid,

554.

24Ibid,

555.
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caste system,

or an "aristocracy of lab or ."25

such a system,

To create

the h ig her pa i d ethnic group legally

restricts the und ercutting group from certain types of work,
limiting the m to low esteem,
Ecological

low p ay jobs.

theory explains the oc currence of ethnic

viole nc e betw ee n su bordinate ethnic groups,

such as that

between blacks in South Africa or bet we en A f r i c a n- Am eri ca ns
and M e xic an -Am er ica ns in Los Angeles.

Such vio le nce results

from one group threa ten in g to dis place another ethny.

Also,

it explains ethnic conflict in relatively p ro sperous
regions,

since it explains ethnic conflict in terms of a

loss of position rather than as a reaction to poverty.
People at any income level will resist attempts to undermine
their and their family's standard of living.
However,
group,

employers and landlords of the dominant' ethnic

pre sum abl y the most influential members of a society,,

should desire a split labor market with new ethnic groups
co ntinually un der cutting the wages of existi ng groups.
e t h nic it y is a rational,
supposes,

they w o u l d always resist e x c lus io nar y or caste-

creating measures.
elites,

economic issue as ecol ogy theory

At times,

however,

like subordinate -c ult ure elites,

25Ibid.

d o m i na nt -cu ltu re
have pr om o t e d

If
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ethnic differentiation.

Ecology theory fails to account for

economic elites that promote ethnic conflict.

Depe nd enc y Theory or Internal Co l o n i a l i s m
The central concept of d e p e n d e n c y theory is the co r e 
p e r iph er y relationship between et hnic groups.

Dependency

theorists posit a concept of a m o d e r n i z a t i o n that originates
in "nodes" or central places and then "spreads or diffuses
into more remote r e gi ons ." 26

This results in different

levels of m o d e r n iza ti on within the same country.

The ethnic

groups that o cc upy the "core" have hi gher ed ucational and
income levels.
The result of this corres pon den ce in spatial
ordering's is that those ethnic groups which are
most proximate to the locus of the impact of
m o d e r n i t y tend to be the most modernized; and thus
the co mpetition for the benefits of m o d e r n i t y and
’for status position in the m o d e r n sector can become
organ ize d on ethnic line.27
The "core" ethny,

generally,

has the most influence within

the state and promotes its culture and identity as the most
modern.

Resistance to the dominant

culture is v i e w e d as

an ti-modern and backwards.

26Robert H. Bates, "Ethnic Competit ion and
M o d e r n i z a t i o n in Co nte mporary A f r i c a , " C omparative Political
Studies 6 (January 1974): 464.
27Ibid.
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De pe nde ncy theorist,
capitalist

M i c ha el Hechter argues that

forms of pro duc tio n create economic disparities

between core and pe ripheral regions that approximate class
lines and cause:
a cultural di vision of labor: a sy stem of s trati
fication where objective cultural distinctions are
supe rimposed upon class lines.
High status o c c u p a 
tions tend to be reserved for those of the m e t r o 
politan culture; while those of indigenous culture
cluster at the b o tto m of the s tra ti fication syst em. 28
The division of labor results in the persi ste nc e of regional
inequality and ethnic solidary.

Div ide d societies suffer

from rebellious ethnic movements among p e ri ph ery groups and
reactionary n a t i o n a l i s m among the m e t r o p o l i t a n groups.
The cultural division of labor e xacerbates the class
conflict.

Such a society is esp ec ial ly oppressive to the

subordinate ethnic group's prol eta ri ans an peasants.

Pierre

van den Berghe argues that in a cul tur all y div ide d society,
"the inequalities of class and e t h ni cit y become CUMULATIVE,
and the system of- d om ination becomes doubly oppressive and
expl o i t a t i v e . " 29

The class struggle becomes complicated and

w o r s e n e d by ethnic differences as subordinate ethnics must
overcome the barrie rs of both class and ethnicity.

28Hechter,

30.

29van den Berghe,
Peru," 75.

"Ethnicity and Class in Highland
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Summary
Co mpetition theorists can'use the e col ogical or
depe nd enc y models for ethnic conflict to assess d iffering
instances of ethnic conflict.

The ecological mode l provides

reasons for ethnic tensions among di sa dva nt age d groups
competing for resources in the same regions without
explaining interregional disputes.

The d ep e n d e n c y model

provides reasons for ethnic m ovements in the per i p h e r y
against the core without addressing conflict between
impoverished ethnies in the periphery.
Competition theorists

fail to account for the motives

and actions of ethnic elites.

If,

roug hl y coincide with class lines,
for the leaders of ethnic m ovements

for example,

ethnic lines

then it makes more sense
in subordinate groups to

m a k e their appeals base d upon class loyalties rather than
ethnic loyalties.
might

This tactic has the advantage that

it

induce proletarians among the dominant group to aid

the movement.

Also,

pri m a r i l y economic,
account

if the grievances of ethnic groups are
then the competition theorists must

for their emphasis upon cultural rights and

autonomy.
Also,

They do not.
competition theories

fail to account

for

instances when ethnic groups experience econom ic dispa ri ty
but do not conflict.

Why,

in some instances,

do ethnic

groups with different prices of labor not experience ethnic
violence?

Why,

under other circumstances,

do ethnic groups

experiencing r eg ion al ly - d i f f e r e n t i a t e d m o d e rni za tio n
pea cef ul ly coexist? .-Both c om pet it ion models are too
simplistic to answer these basic questions.
Mo no causal theories,

w h e the r they address

or interregional competition,

intraregional

lack the sophistication to

explain the complexities of ethnic conflict.

Competition

theory fails to deal with important questions concerning
cases of ethnic conflict.

It offers insight into the

economic d i m en sio n of ethnic conflict,
pertain only in specific cases.

Other,

but its conclusions
more so phisticated

theories arose to address the shortcomings of the
competition theories.

CHA PT ER III
OT H E R C O N F L ICT UA L MO D E R N I Z A T I O N I S T S

The competition models
conflict unaddressed,

left

important aspects of ethnic

such as the m o t i v a ti ons of elites who

politicize ethnic it y or conflicts b e t w e e n groups
experiencing economic parity.

Other conflictual

m o de rn iza tio ni sts d e v elo pe d a more s o p h i st ica te d vi e w of the
process of mo der n i z a t i o n and its effects on ethnic
relations.

T hey enhance d competition theory by proposing

that the process of modernization,

whic h destroys

traditional orders and replaces th e m w it h
structures,

'modern'

entails more than just the in creased economic

competition.

Conflictual m o der ni zat io nis ts vi e w

m o der n i z a t i o n as a process with m a n y aspects that affect
ethnic relations.
Conflictual m o d e r n i za tio ni sts emphasize that
mo de r n i z a t i o n itself entails changes that cause ethnic
conflict.

It upsets ancient

societies and creates a social

system where some groups enjoy the elements of m o d e r n i t y
that give them advantages over competing groups.
formerly isolated groups,

Also,

because of improved tran spo rta ti on
28

29

and communication,

find themselves

in a broadened,

complex

po lity in which they must compete wit h other ethnies.

The

conflictual mo de rni z a t i o n i s t s belie ve that ethnic
competition is an inevitable result of mod er n i z a t i o n and
increased group interaction.
A c c o r d i n g to an early co nflictual modernizationist,
Karl Deutsch,

m o d e rn iza ti on causes social mobilization,

involvement in mass politics,
societies.1

among the citizens of changing

The social integration and the economic

interdependence of m o d e rn iza tio n promote a ssi milation into
the new polity.
assimilation,

If social mob ili z a t i o n outraces

then the society will d i s i n t e g r a t e . 2

A c c o r d i n g to Deutsch,

ethnic ties cause:

consolidation of states whose peoples already share
the same language, culture, and ma jor institutions;
while the same process m a y tend to destroy the
unity of states whose po pul ati on is already divided
into several groups with d ifferent languages or
cultures or basic ways of life .3

^ h e n he wrote Na t i o n a l i s m and Social Communic ati on
(New York: W i l e y and Sons, 1953), Deutsch p ro po s e d that
m o d e r n i z a t i o n w o u l d decrease ethnic conflict.
For his.
changing views on this issue, see W a l k e r Connor, "NationBuilding or Nation- Des tr oyi ng, " : 319-28.
2Karl Deutsch, Na t i o n a l i s m and Its A l ter na tiv es (New
York: A l f r e d Knopf, 1969), 27.
By assimilation, Deutsch
implies either the destruction of one culture, or the
amalga ma tio n of both cultures into one homogenous group.
3De uts ch,'"Social Mobil iza ti on, " Am er i c a n Political
.Science Review 55 (September 1961): 501.
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Thus,

Deutsch accounts for the consolid at ion .and persistence

of some states and the d i s i n t e gr ati on of others.
Low rates of social mobilization,
creation of m o d e r n Engla nd and France,
assimilation,

as occ ur red in the
or high rates of

as w i t n e s s e d when immigrants flocked to the

United States,

coincide with integrating m o d e r n i z a t i o n . 4

High rates of mobilization,

as o ccurred during the sudden

creation of m a n y of the Th i r d Wo r l d sta te s,5 and low rates
of assimilation,

as occurs among "secluded po pulations of

villages close to the soil," result in d i f fe re nti at ion and
disunity.6

Countries in which ass imi la tio n had not occurred

prior to the rapid social m o bil iz ati on of twentieth century
in du strialization are un lik el y to resolve their ethnic
problems and differentiation,

because m o d e r n i z a t i o n worke d

against them.7

4Peutsch.

N a t i o n a l i s m and Its A l t e r n a t i v e s . 73 and 126.

5Ibid, 73.
Deutsch speci fi cal ly names the formations
of Tanzania, Zambia, and Malavia.
He writes, "We have seen
that the more grad ual ly the process of social mob ili za tio n
moves, the more there is time for social a nd national
assimilation to work.
Conversely, the more these processes
are postponed, the more quickly its various a s p e c t s —
language, monetization, mass audience, literacy, voting,
urbanization, i ndu st r i a l i z a t i o n — must e v e ntu al ly be
achieved.
But whe n all these developments have to be
crowded into the lifetime of one or two generations, the
chances for as si milation to work are much smaller.
6Deutsch,
7Conhor,

N a t i o n a l i s m and Social C o m m u n i c a t i o n . 12 6.
"Nation-Building or Nation -De st roy ing ,"

326.
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The De struction of Traditional Social Order
A c c o r d i n g to the conflictual modernizationists,
destruc ti on of traditional

the

social order during colonization

or m o d e r ni za tio n constitutes a key element in understa nd ing
ethnic c o n f l i c t .
colonization,

Wheth er or not they experi enc ed

m o d e r n izi ng societies construct new economic

and political orders out of the existing conditions.
Citizens,

who organize their lives with in family or tribal

structures,

must learn to cope with and a ssi milate to a new

p o lit y of expanded size and complexity.
Traditional

status and a uthority lose their m e a nin g in

the changing society.

Jobs that once commanded esteem,

as those of the hunter or tribal leader,

such

become outmoded.

In a society that incr ea sin gly values the goods that m one y
can buy,

those in tr aditional positions of a u t hor it y can not

purchase the pro ducts of modernity,

and their wages are

shameful compared to.those of modern clerks,
teachers.

lawyers and

As the structures of old societies fade,

re-e stablish social relations of status,

reward,

Ac c o r d i n g to conflictual m o d e r n i z a t i o n theory,
reworking of relationships and values
conflict.

people

and power.

this

is reflected as ethnic

The interplay be twe en the old an d the new
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st ra tifications is "crucially significant

in explaining the

emergence of ethnic groups in the m o d ern era ."8
Co lo nization necessitated d isr upting social order and
indelibly left its ma r k upon the ethnic and social
strat ifi ca tio n of colonized regions.

Colonial states

created new centers of p olitical activity,

attracting

diverse mem ber s into unfamiliar types of social regulation.
European a n d bu re au c r a t i c men ta lit ies rejected loose,
vagu el y defined,

small-scale identities.

anathema to a dmi nistrative rationality,
physical map with discrete,

They were "an
wh ich d em a n d e d a

bounded units."9

Colonizers created colonial borders wit h little or no
concern for the ethnic makeup of the indigenous
p o p u l a t i o n s . 10

Colonial states,

once created,

"radically

a ltered existing patterns of social stratification and
et h n i c i t y . " 11

Binding culturally distinct,

small

po pulations together u n d e r 'admin ist ra tiv e rule,

the

colonizers c r e a ted the conditions of later ethnic conflicts.

8Bates,

111

462.

9C ra wford Young, "Patterns.of Social Change," Daedalus
(Spring 1982): 79.

10Ibid.,75.
Whe n colonizers d i d take ethnic identities
into account, it was often with the intent of dividing
groups and r ecombining them with d i s s im ila r groups as a
"divide-and-rule" tactic, thus aggrav at ing conditions.
u I b i d . , 76.

Europeans
most regions.

fun damentally disr upt ed ethnic relations in
Except in Islamic regions,

p r e-c olo ni al life

was cha racterized by smallness of scale and isolation from
competing groups.

Ethnic and religious communities lacked

large-scale political structures.

Social organ iza tio n took

place around small scale units like the family,
village.

Thus,

'interlocking,

tribe,

or

cultural affinities were in their essence
overlapping,

(and) m u l t i p l e . ' " 12

fluidity of social and ethnic boundaries,

meant an absence

of "crystallized ideologies of ide nti ty ."13
of modernization,

This

Wit h the onset

ethnic identities were c h a r act eri ze d by

larger scale identities wit h mor e distinct boundaries.
M o d e r niz at ion and colonization de s t r o y e d traditional
structures and ways of life.

.Social status and values lost

their me ani ng in d i s rup te d societies.

Small-scale

identities were lost in an ex panded social order.
Mo d e rn iza tio n replaced ancient patterns of isolation with a
system of unequal c o m p e t i t i o n •between groups that had
expe ri e n c e d differential modernization.
A weaknes s of the conflictual m od ern iz a t i o n i s t approach
is its need for an outside influence to explain conflict
within a society.

12Ibid.

79.

13Ibid.

78.

It assumes that an outside force,

such as
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colonization or a central state,

destroys traditional social

structures and sets in motion the struggle for status and
w e alt h in t h e .new order.

However,

while ethnic conflict

occurs in societies that have e x p e r ie nce d the dis ruption of
traditional structures,

it also has flared up in

in du str ial iz ed states and in societies whose traditional
structures remain largely i ntact.14

Lacking an external

'source of the d estruction of traditional order,

conflictual

m o d e r n i za tio nis ts have difficulties accounting for conflict.

Differential M ode r n i z a t i o n
Differential m ode rni za tio n is central to the
assumptions' of the conflictual mo de rni zationists.

They

be li eve d that different ethnic groups mo d e r n i z e d at
different rates..

Europeans favo red some groups,

t h e m as c ol laborating indigenes.

These groups,

reasons or because conditions fo rced them,

coopting
for cultural

ele cte d to deal

wit h the colonizers on their own terms by acquiring European
educations and competing for jobs in the colonial
administration.

Other groups,

favored by the colonizers,
colonial capitals and,

though not necess ari ly

inha bit ed regions closer to the

thus,

wer e exp os ed to m ode rni zi ng ■

14As is the case in Kurdistan, es p e c i a l l y Iraq where
much of the violence has taken place.
See Chapter VII.
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forces earlier.

Still others resisted colonization, and

ass im ila ti on or inhabited remote regions and,

thus,

were

seen as b ackwards or unintelligent ethnic groups.
The most m o d e r n i z e d groups held the presti gio us jobs
and the positions in the administrations of the colonies and
newly independent states.

They g ai ne d a headstart vis-a-vis

other groups in the competition for the poli tic al and
economic rewards of the m o der n world,

t h e reb y creating

objective class differences between f orm erl y classless
ethnic groups.

The emerging social classes tended to

reinforce ethnic differences,

creating

"more naked

confrontation and greater likelihood of secessionist and
other m ovements of communal n a t i o n a l i s m . " 15
Inequality betw een ethnic groups p e rs is ted and the
effects of colonization outla st ed the colonial period.
Conflictual m o d e r ni zat ion theory argued that both the
adv ant ag ed and di sad v a n t a g e d groups develop new,

economic

grievances against other ethnies during modernization.
se emingly inevitable,

"The

uneven economic development of regions

triggers animosities among both the b e n e f i t t e d groups and
the unfav ore d o n e s . " 16

Unlike group competition in

15Robert M el son and Howard Wolpe, " Modernization and
the Politics of Communalism" Ame r i c a n Political Science
Review 64 (December 1970): 1116.

traditional societies,

which occurr ed between small-scale

groups p e r c e i v e d of as equals, ’ethnic co mpetition during
m o d e r n i z a t i o n implies an unequal race between large-scale
groups

for advantages w i thi n an increasingly p e rv asi ve

society.

Often,

those with economic and political

advantages un de r colonialism,

u se d their power to further

enhance their advantage.

Increased Interaction
Conflictual m o d e r n i z ati on ist s argue that m a n y of the
no n- economic forces of mo der n i z a t i o n impact ethnic
relations.

During modernization,

formerly isolated ethnic

groups come into contact with others.who are different
themselves,

with different values,

different levels of modernization.

different

languages,

from
and

The larger p o l i t y of the

mo d e r n society intrudes upon their isolated world,
regardless of their desires,
their lifestyles.

Different groups respond to the forces of

m o d e r n i t y in different ways.
assimilation,
Ethnic groups'

and they are forced to adjust

Some assimilate,

and others attempt to assimilate,

others resist
but can not.

reactions to m od ern ity 's alterations of

social structures determine the likelihood of conflict.

16W a l k e r Connor, "The Politics of E t h n o n a t i o n a l i s m , "
Journal of International Affairs (1973): 21.
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Conflictual. mo der niz at ion is ts b l a m e d increased group
interaction of m o d e r n i t y for ethnic conflict.
modernization,

With

societies experience increases in the

quantity and q u a l it y of tran sp ort at ion and communication.
Trains,

automobiles,

roads,

radios,

television,

and

telephones decrease the cultural isolation and autonomy that
ethnic groups enjo yed in previous eras.
(Modern forces) curtail the i solation in which an
ethnic group could formerly cloak its cultural
chasteness from perverting influences of other
cultures w i t hin the same state.
The reaction to
such curtailment is very apt to be one of
xenophobic ho s t i l i t y . 17
People became aware of others who shared their ethnic
identity and others who did not.

Conflictual

modernizat ion is ts believe that this awareness leads to
discord more often than u n d e r s t a n d i n g . 18
M o d e r niz at ion expands each individual's potential
economic competitors.
labor,

M o d e rn iza tio n "penetrates markets for

turning local markets into industry-wide m a r k e t s . " 19

Skilled laborers,

unski lle d laborers,

and job-seekers,

whe the r they choose to remain in their traditional homes or

17Connor,

"Nation-Building or Nation- De str oy ing ,"

18Connor,

"The Politics of Et hno na tionalism," 20.

329.

19Susan Olzak, The Dynamics of Ethnic Co mpetition and
Conflict (Stanford, California: Sta nfo rd U n i v er sit y Press,
1992), 18.
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move to the urban, centers,

find themselves in competition

wit h vast numbers of cu lt ura lly different people.
m o der n economy and polity,

In a

tribal and kinship organizations

are not powerful enough to compete.
To compete and survive,
of a b r o a der collective,

individuals must

seek the help

such as an ethnic nation.

person remaining in his or her traditional home,

For the

the tribal

or kinship group has little influence upon p olitical
decisions made far away or upon economic forces that can
render entire villages jobless.
i n dus trialized cities,

For the immigrant to

the tribal or kinship group is

powerless to assist in p roviding food,
employment.

The result

"ethnic boundary."

shelter and

is a tendency to broa den their

Thus,

the "spread of m o d e r n economic

structures causes a decline in ethnic d i v e r s i t y " 20 and
fosters a p o p u la tio n acti va ted "on the basis of larger scale
i d e n tit ies ." 21

Loyalty to and dependence upon family and

tribe are replaced by loyalty to and dependence upon a
larger ethnic identity.
Ethnic groups play an important role in h elping people
gain urban employment,

income,

and education.

In Uganda,

co mpetition for jobs in the Rail way A fr ic a Union formed

20Hannan,
21Ibid;

254 .

272.
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along ethnic l ines.22
meant promotion,
Often,

Since high office, in the union often

employees fi erc el y sought these positions.

they app ea led to the tribal loyalties of those in

charge of hiring.

In other parts, of Africa,

"less favored

members of an ethnic group place immense pressure on their
more a dva ntaged brothers to share the benefits from their
ad vanced p o s i t i o n s . " 23
In a mu lti - e t h n i c state,

the ec on o m i c stakes of one's

ethnic group losing its posit ion are high.

Often e t hn ici ty

determines the allocation of g ov ernment p ositions and
mid dle -c las s ethnics owe their livelihoods to jobs in the
government bureaucracy.
The state bourgeo isi e has little au ton om y relative
to the state; its standing in soc ie ty is not rooted
in the control of property, wealth, or productive
facilities.
A n individual's class m e m b ers hip is
contingent upon remaining wi thin the orbit of
e s tab lis he d political au t h o r i t y . 24
The cost of one's ethnic group's p olitical downfall might be
unemployment an d poverty.
victory,

In such a polity,

or at least'stalemate,

identity and

in the ethnid conflict

becomes a life a nd death matter.

22R. D. Grillo, "The tribal factor in an East Af ric an
trade union" q uo ted in Tradition and T ran sition in East
A f r i c a , ed. P.H. G ulliver (Berkeley, California: Uni ver si ty
of California Press, 1969), 297-321. in Bates 469.
23Bates,

4 68.

24Young,

"Patterns of Social Change,"

81-2.
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Politicizing Ethnicity
The conflictual m o d e r n i z a t i o n i s t s 'ex am i n e d forces
b e y o n d those of simple economic competition.

T h e y also

attempted to explain when elites will a cti v e l y pro mot e
political organi za tio n along ethnic indentities,
pol iti ci ze ethnicity.

or

The broade ne d p o l ity of the

mo de rn i z i n g society increases the effectiveness of the
"ethnicity card"

in the politics of the new state.

The

rapid social and ec onomic changes in m o d e r n i z i n g societies
create the "optimal conditions" for p o l i t i c i z i n g ethnic
ident ity .25

Cr aw for d Young writes,

"The surest w ay for

aspiring leaders to bu i l d their c onstituencies was to
mobi li ze their ethnic c lie nt e l e . " 26

Ap pea ls to ethnic

identity attach a real interest to a p r e - e x i s t i n g affective
ti e . 27

The politics of m od ern iz ing societies

sets ethnic

groups against one another for the rewards of modern,
economics,

and energizes the political strength of ethnic

ties by attaching th e m to even larger constituencies.
The political co mpetition between ethnies takes place
in an environment of higher stakes and fear.

25Joseph Rothschild,
Un i v e r s i t y P r e ss) ,248.

Ethnopolitics

For the

(New York:

26Young,

"Patterns of Social Change," 89.

27Young,

"The Dialects of Cultural Pluralism,"

Columbia

22.
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citizen of an ethnically di vid ed society,

while he or she is

being appealed to on the basis 'of ethnicity,

he or she. is

also aware that other ethnic groups are being similarly
courted.

Even if he or she is not inclined to mo bilize

aroun d ethnic identity,

he or she m a y be forced to out of

fear of the loss of p osition in the social stratification
sy stem or fear of domination by other ethnic groups.
For elites that po lit ic ize e th ni cit y within a society,
the advantages of mobi liz in g one's ethny holds a second
important advantage.

E thnicity is "distinct from all other

m u lt i p l e and secondary sources of identity people acquire
because unlike all others,
group a

its elements are what m a k e a

'candidate for n a t i o n h o o d . ' " 28

Thus,

po lit ic ize d

ethnicity becomes a "crucial p r in cip le of political
legitimation and delig iti ma tio n of systems,
and go ve r n m e n t s . " 29

regimes

Ethnic ity is so potent as a

legitimizing prin cip le that,
out,

states,

as Joseph Ro th schild points

people p re fe r b ad rule by their ethnic br others over

good rule by aliens,

occupiers,

or c o l o n ize rs. 30

28Harbld Isaacs, "Basic Groups Identity: The Idols of
the Tribe," in E t h n i c i t y , eds. Nathan Glazer and Daniel P.
Mo yn i h a n (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U n i ve rs ity
Press, 1975): 30.
29Rothschild,
30Ibid,

14.

2.

While earlier theorists had e m p h asi ze d the "nationbuilding" p otential of ethnic national

identities,

the

conflictual mod er n i z a t i o n i s t s e mphasize its "nationdestroying" potential.
The nation itself, the object of every nationalism's
endeavors, is artificial, a concept and model of
social and cultural or gan ization which is the
product of the labours of self- sty le d nationalists
bent on attai nin g po wer and reaping the rewards of
the political s t r u g g l e . 31
Ethnic elites ask,
ethnicity,

if a nation is founded upon one

then wh y not found another upon another

ethnicity.

E th n i c i t y could be created and re-created for

political p u r p o s e s —

used to defend the creation of a nat

or promote its independence,

on the one hand,

and used to

attack its existence by supporting se p a r a t i s m or
irredentism,

on the other h a n d . 32

Elite M otivations
■Conflictual m o d e r n i z ati oni st s emphasize the role of
elites in ethnic conflict.

Elites,

they argue., are those

w h o have the most influence within a society,

and it is

31A. D. Smith, "N ati onalism and Historians!"
International Journal of Comparative Soci olo gy 33
59.
32This is the fundamental as su mption of
'instrumentalism,' the way that most conflictual
m o d e r n i z a t i o n i s t s p o r t r a y the formation of ethnic
identities.
See Chapter IV.

(1992):
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elites that choose to p oli ticize ethnic identity.

The

conflictual m o d e r n i zat ion is ts look at elite motiv es in
p o l iti ci zin g ethnic identity as a factor in explaining
ethnic conflict.
The conflictual m ode rni za tio ni st A.

D. Smith,

in his

book The Ethnic R e v i v a l , adv anced a thesis that di sg run tl ed
elites,

the professional bureaucrats,

are prime instigators

of ethnic stri fe. 33 -The intellectuals c on cep tu ali ze the
arguments for any given ethnic group's nationalism,
intelligentsia,

but the

from the upper and m i d d l e classes,

po liticizes ethn ic ity and carries the m e s sa ge to the
m a s s e s . 34

He writes,

"If the intellectuals are the

spearhead of the ethnic revival,

the prof ess io nal

intelligentsia form its habitual

infa nt ry. "35

In Smith's scenario,

the disappointment of p otential

bureauc ra ts fuels ethnic movements.

Educated,

would-be

elites seek employment in m e t r o p o l i t a n areas and fail to
b e com e employed commensurate to their training.
preju di ce and ethnic differences
succeed.

They return,

34Smith,

for their inabil it y to

disgruntled,

33A. D. Smith, Ethnic Revival
U n i v er sit y Press, 1981)

to their ethnic groups

(Cambridge:

The Ethnic R e v i v a l . 108-12.

35I b i d . , 108.

They blame

Cambridge
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and lead ethnic movements against the existing system of
social stratification.

Th e y d e m a n d special cultural rights,

which they as the elites of the cultural group can use for
political and economic gain,

or deter min e that a separate

society is necessary for their success.
Jyotirindra Das Gupta the o r i z e d that some conditions
decrease the advantage of polit ici zi ng ethn ic ity and,

thus,

mak e it less likely that elites will promote it as an
organizing principle.

Examining the complex, cultural

divisions of India wit h its countless ethnic identities,

he

argued that w hen the cultural markers of e thnicity were
"c r o s s -c ut tin g” instead of "cumulative," ethnicity lost its
usefulness for political le ade rs .36
In India,

ma j o r religious communities are split into

m a n y language communities which in turn are stratified into
castes and class formations.

C ros s- cut tin g identifiers

reduce the temptation for leaders to employ ethnicity to
gain an easy constituency because it decreases the poten tia l
political returns.
cumulative,

However,

with linguistic,

when ethnic identifiers are
religious,

regional,

or racial

36Jyotirindra Das Gupta, "India: Democratic Becoming
and Combined Development," in Politics in Developing
Countries e d s . Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour
M a rti n Lipset (Boulder, Colorado: Lynn Reiner, 1990.): 24143.
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cleavages overlapping,

ethn ici ty is a. powerful

instrument of

advancing political demands.
In the twentieth century,

Indian elites have attempted

to organize collectives along linguistic ties.
Intellectuals created literary societies,

cultural

organizations and political associations to advance the
cause of their respective language,

but have been thwarted

because language communities often included members of
different races,

religions,

For example,

castes and r e g i o n s . 37

in the resource rich,

but pove rt y stricken

region of A s s a m in the 1980s, A ss a m e s e ethnic leaders
articulated a notion of the "unjust d e pri va tio n of the
As sa mes e p e o p l e . " 38

Earlier notions of As sam ese

authenticity h a d forwarded a concept of a language-based
community.

Later,

however,

the m ove men ts leaders sought to

exclude many M u s l i m speakers of the language because they
wer e immigrants from, neighboring Bangladesh.
Hindi speakers and Muslims

Other non-

from the region drifted away from

the movement and were used by Raj iv Gandhi's government to
force the Ass am e s e to mi tigate their d e m a n d s . 39

37Das Gupta, "Ethnicity, Language, Demands, and
National Development in India," in G lazer and Moynihan,
88.
38Das Gupta,
39Ibid.

"India," 241.

241-42.
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I

Ronald Rogowski used rational choice theory to predict
whe n elites will po lit ic ize ethnic identity.
two types of systems:

"plural" systems,

He proposed

the classical

cultural d ivision of labor "in which one culture monopolizes
the elite positions and skills," and "pillarized"

systems

"in which both cultures have ample n u m b e r s ,of persons with
both elite and nonelite ski ll s." 40

He be lie v e d that

"pillarized" systems experience the highest p rob ab i l i t y of
ethnic v io l e n c e . 41
In the rational choice model of ethnic relations,
elites employing ethnic ideologies consider their potential
benefit

from the course of action,

the a n t i c ipa te d cost of

that action and the likelihood of s uc ces s.42

Elites,

w h e t he r supporting existing state policies or questioning
them,

choose to poli ti ciz e ethnicity to "maximize net

b e n e f i t . " 43 - A c c o r d i n g to Rogowski:

40Ronald Rogowski “Causes and Varieties of Nationalism:
A Rationalist Account" in New Nationalisms of the Developed
West e d s . Ronald Rogowski and Edward A. Tirya kia n (Boston:
Al le n and Unwin, 1985), 91.
41Ibid.

90.

42Ibid., 88-89.
He proposes the formula Ap*B-C,
B is the benefits of a course of action, C is the

where

an ticipated cost of the action, and Ap is the change in the
prob ab ili ty of receiving the benefit if the a cto r takes the
course of action.
43Ibid.

88.
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Na t i o n a l i s m is always rational in the sense just
given, that is, emb rac ed by the given individual
because, and to the extent that, it offers h im a
greater net benefit (or mutatis mutandis a lesser '
net loss) than do other p os sible investments of
e f f o r t .44
He b e l i e v e d that rational choice explains how individuals
from each type of ethnic group within a state react to
ethnic group dominance-- whether by assimilation,
apathy,

isolation,

or radical nationalism.

Thus,

according to Rogowski,

elites espouse ethnic

n a tio nal is m most often in "pillarized"

systems.

This occurs

because only groups whose elites believe they can supply all
essential skills,

or believe that they can compensate for

any skills that they lack, will seek the destru cti on of the
status q u o . 45

Elites will advocate ethnic na t i o n a l i s m when

they expect that the future autonomous nation will have a
favorable supply-demand ratio for their par ticular skills.
In "plural" societies,

on the other hand,

up war dly mobile

elites face strong pressure to assimilate and will do so,
taking the path of least resistance,

if m o b i l i t y is allowed.

By arguing that the economic motives of elite s. cau se
ethnic conflict,

conflictual m o d e r n iz ati oni st s

like Smith

44Ibid.
The benefits sought, according to Rogowski,
are economic gain and political authority.
45Rogowski Claims that the frequent rise of n a t i o n a l i s m
in regions that suddenly acquire great wealth or valuable
resources, such as oil, proves this thesis.
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and Rogowski ignore the cultural aspects of ethnic conflict.
They account for m o b i li zat io n along ethnic lines,

but not

the emphasis by ethnic elites upon cultural symbols.
for example,

do m a r g i n a l i z e d ethnies

d e struction of their culture,

Why,

fear for the

or the loss of their

.historical and religious traditions?

Also,

they do not

answer why language and educational policies concerning it
play such an important role in the demands of ethnic
movements.

Summary
The conflictual moderniz ati on theorists view
mode rn iza tio n as a process that exacerbates ethnic tensions,
creating conditions that are likely to result in ethnic
conflict.
political

Societies evolving from tr aditional economic and
structures undergo radical change.

An

interdependent eco no my with a c e n t r ali ze d a u th ori ty and a
society which i nc rea s i n g l y values the rewards that mod e r n i t y
brings

replaces traditional means of survival,

social organizations,
The differential
groups

and traditional values.
impact of m o d e r n i z a t i o n affects ethnic

in. different ways.

As the modernizing,

polit y incorporates more ethnic groups,
modernize,

small scale

expanding

some adapt,

and cooperate with c olo nizing powers,

while
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others resist the effects of modernization,

unable or

unwilling to alter their traditional lifestyles.

A d v a nt age d

groups use their power to improve their position,

both

eco nom ic all y and politically,

vis-a-vis other groups.

Economic competition between membe rs of different ethnic
groups and a sense that one's fate is inext ri cab ly linked to
one's ethnic kin energize the importance of ethnic ties.
Elites,

armed wi t h the potent ideologies of ethnicity

and ethnonationalism,
changing society,

compete for advantages w i t h i n the

wh e r e citizens increasingly rely upon

larger ethnic identities as a modern support system.
try to gain important economic positions,

Elites

and those who fail

use ethnic ideologies of o rga nization to contest the
legitimacy of the status quo.

These forces result in large-

scale ethnic groups competing with each other for economic
and political gains in starkly d i v ide d polities.
For conflictual modernizationists,

ethnic conflict is

essen tia ll y the result of rational, m a t e r i a l i s t interests.
M o d e r n i z a t i o n provides the underlying conditions for
effective ethnic mobilization.

Ethnicity is p o l i t i c i z e d by

elites when it is advantageous,

and it is used for rational

goals.

If conditions favor o rga nization along ethnic lines,

elites activate their own ethnic identities to gain
positions of economic advantage or p olitical power,

or fight
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for a separate society in which they can hold these
positions.
The conflictual mod er ni za ti o ni st s e n h an ce d competition
theory by addressing the motiva ti ons of elites and the
reasons for organizing along et hni c lines.
reliance upon rational,

However,

their

ma terial interests to explain ethnic

conflict result in their theory's inability to answer some
important questions about ethnic conflict.

While their

th eory attributes rational moti ves to the elites,
that nonelites are irrational,
jobs,

it assumes

willing to sacrifice their

and lives for the advancement of elites.

Also,

it

disregards the “irra ti ona l” elements of ethnic conflict.
does not explain why those organizing ar ound et hic ity are
will ing to destroy the economies and political structures
from which they hope to gain the goods of modernity.

Nor

does it explain the pe rsistence of conflict over several
generations,

long after the original goals are forgotten.

It

CHA PT ER IV
PRIMORDIALISTS

The pri mor dialists emphasize the uniqueness of
ethnicity as a social identifier.

Primordialists argue that

ethnic identity is unique because,, unlike class membership,
which can change with economic and occupational changes,
people can not alter their ethnic identity.
appeal of ethnicity,

understood by "poets,

The powerful
artists,

and

historians," had been lacking from the social scientist's
un derstanding of ethnic i de nt ity .1
modern,

historical,

Each person has p r e 

and cultural ties to those who share his

or her ethnic ity a n d , .thus,

regardless of economics,

his or

her fate is inextricably linked to that group.
The pri mordialists explain two aspects of ethnic
conflict that the conflictual mo der ni z a ti on is ts
unexplored.

left

Whereas the conflictual modernizati on ist s

examined the rational,
along ethnic lines,

material motives of groups or ganizing

the pri mo rdialists account

for their

irrational m ot ive s and the importance of ethnic or national

’•Isaacs,

30-31.
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identity to an individual's sense of worth.

The conflictual

moder ni zat io nis ts theorize about the motives of elites,

and

characte ri zed nonelites as irrational or ea sily manipul ate d
by ethnic elites.

Primordialists account for nonelite

involvement in ethnic movements and w h y they sacrifice
personal benefit

for the sake of their ethnic g r o u p . 2

Instrume nt ali sm and Pr imo rdi al ism
Pri mo rdi al ism is best v ie we d as a theoret ica l response
to instrumentalism.

Instrumen ta lis m and p ri mo rd ia li sm

examine how individuals and groups create their ethnic
identities.

Most conflictual mo de rn iz at ion ist s followed the

instrumentalist concept of identity creation and believed
that ethnicity was a crea ted identity,

m a n u f a c t u r e d as a

political tool for the advantages of the elites.
Primordialists argue that ethnic identity is d ee pl y rooted
in the socialization process and the human sense of self
worth.
Ins tru men ta lis m o ri gi na ted with the Mar xis ts and found
a large following among early scholars of ethnic conflict in

2Donald Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley,
California: Un iv ers it y of California Press, 1985), 147.
He
writes: "the willing ne ss of group members to sacrifice
economic gains for comparative advantage is redolent of
ethnic group b e h a v i o r that casts doubts on ma ter ia lis t
theories of conflict."
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the 1950's and 1960's.

The instrumentalists

stressed the

creation and re-creation of ethni c identity as a tool or
we apon in political and social competition.
successive Marxists,

Marx,

and

emp ha si z ed the uses of et hnicity to

incorporate competing classes wi thin a given nation,

for the

advantages ga in ed by the ruling classes.
Most conflictual modernizationists,
the Marxists,

in the tradition of

emp has ize d the value of ethnicity as an

organizing principle in social competit io n for political and
economic resources.

They argued that ethnic identity has an

advantage over other potential organizational principles,
because,
tie ."3

"it can combine an interest with an affective
For instrumentalists,

somewhat situational,
identity,

ethnic identity may be

circumstantial and transitory

but it provides a p r e-e xis ti ng con stituency for

those seeking po we r or. those already involved in competition
for power..

Instrumentalists port ray ethnic groups

least ethnic elites)

as calculating,

(or at

sel f-interested actors

attempting to max imize their gains through the use of ethnic
identity.
Pri mo rdi al ism has exp eri en ced three different phases
during the study of ethnic conflict.

Its roots can be

3Daniel Bell, "Ethnicity and Social Change," in Gla.zer
and Moynihan, 169.

traced back to the simplistic notions of the Liberals,

who

saw ethnicity and nat io nh oo d as a given,

a self-evident,

natural principle of human organization.

It enjoyed a

resurgence in the writings of D ur k he im and the "strain"
theorists,

who po rtr ay ed individual humans as incomplete

animals that fulfil themselves through their social
organizations.
Later,

pr im o r d i a l i s m was revi ve d as a critique of

instrumentalism.

Primordialism,

"renovated by its dialogue

with instrumentalism," re-emerged to explore ethnicity's
psychological and cultural dimensions that explain the often
irrational nature of ethnic .conflict.4

Fredrik Barth

prese nte d ethnic identity as a set of cues,
values

(ethnic markers)

distinctiveness;

symbols,

and

that pro vid ed a person's

separating his group from the "others."5

Van den Berghe related ethnicity as "an ext en ded form 'of kin
selection," and an almost instinctual
Ethnicity,

loy a lt y. 6

in its capacity as a psy chological link to

the ancient past of ancestors and the unknown future of

“Crawford Young, "The Dialects of Cu ltural Pluralism,"
in The Rising Tide of Cultural P l u r a l i s m , ed. Crawford Young
(Madison, Wisconsin: Un iv er si ty of W i s co ns in Press, 1993),

22 .
5Barth,

9-38.

6Van den Berghe, "Race and Ethnicity: A Sociobiological
Perspective" Ethnic and Racial Studies 1 (1978): 401-11.
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descendants',

has a unique ly emotional charge.

By examining

the emotional side of ethnic ity and the “irra ti ona l” needs
it fulfills for those emphasizing their ethnic identity,
primordialists explain the de ep - s e a t e d anxieties,
for the loss of a v al ue d past,
future,

the fears

the insecurities about the

the horror of cultural extinction,

aggression wi tn es se d in ethnic competition,
une xp lai na ble in terms of mat er i al

and the levels of
which are

interests.

Dur kheim
Emile D u r k h e i m 1s wrot e that the moral unity of a
society is ba sed up on ’ a collective consciousness of "shared"
experience,

repres ent ed b y a n d ce l e br at ed in common sacred

symbols and "primordial"

id ent ifi ca ti o n. 7

These symbols,

which can include anything from religious traditions to
common physical traits,

are the indispensable glue which

holds society together.

Du rk h ei m be li eve d that these sacred

'symbols worked best at unifying primitive societies.
With modernization,
of labor.

societies' experience sp eci alization

Du rkh eim expected economic interdependence to

gradually replace primordial symbols as the source of unity
in advanced societies,

and the primordial ties of ethnicity

7Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in S o c i e t y .
George Simpson, trans., (New York: Free Press, 1933).
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to disappear with modernization.

He thought that the

emotional strength of the "sacred symbols" wo u l d fade as
they became less necess ary for the unity of a society.
Durkheim,

like Marx, m is i nt er p r e t e d e th ni cit y as a relic of

bygone e r a s .

Strain Theorists
Strain theorists,

like Neil J. S me ls er 8 and Clifford

G ee rt z, 9 bo r r o w e d from Durkheim's theories and concluded ,
that ethnic conflict wo u ld surge as a p ro b l e m for societies,
but woul d even tu all y d i s a pp ea r. 10

As societies evolve from

a reliance upon primordial ties to a reliance upon economic
interdependence for social unity,

strain theorists believe

that ma ny will suffer from "isolation com bin ed with general
'culture sho c k. '" 11

These unintegrated' citizens cling to

archaic ethnic identifiers for psyc hol og ica l security until
their society achieves levels of structural

integration high

enough to include all of its members.

8Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior
York:
Free Press, 1963).

(New

9Clifford Geertz, "Ideology as a Cultural System" in
Ideology and D i s c o n t e n t , ed. David E. A p t e r (New York: Free
Press, 1963),47-77.
10see Newman,
“ Smelser,

454-5.

326.
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Strain theorists posit the chronic m a li nt eg ra ti on of
society.

Social friction is persistent and will always

require unifying ideologies

like na ti on al ism or ethnicity.

No social ar rangement is or can be completely
successful in coping with the functional problems
it inevitably faces.
All are riddled with insoluble
antimonies: between liberty and political order,
stability and change, ef fi ci en cy and humanity,
precision and flexibility, and so f o r t h . 12
To m ai nt ai n social unity,
resort to ideologies,

societies,

like ethnicity.

leaders and people,
These ideologies hold

the society tog ether until their inherent inconsistencies
cause them to lose their pow er as symbols of unity.
In Old Societies and N ew S t a t e s . Geertz outlines the
patte rn for pre-industrial,
ma in tai n social u n i t y . 13

m od er niz in g state's attempts to

A c c or di ng to him,

primitive

societies rely exclusi ve ly upon ethnic kinship ties for
social unity.

The strains of colonization can be reduced by

a co ntinued emphasis upon race,
c u st om s. 14

Often societies

language,

religion,

and

in contact with colonizing

powers experienced a resurgence in religion and xen ophobic
adherence to ancient customs.

12Geertz,
13Geertz,
Press, 1963).
“ Smelser,

Ethnic ties become

"Ideology as a Cultural System,"
Old Societies and New States

54.

(New York:

The Theory of Co llective B e h a v i o r . 354.

Free
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p ol it ici zed betw een colonized and col onizing po pu l at io ns ,15
Eventually,

the strain theorists believed,

its unifying authority.

Kinship,

tribe,

ethnicity loses

language,

region or

cu stom lack the unifying power neces sar y to ma intain order
in a mo der n society.
Strain theorists believe that unity in a moder n society
can only be m a i nt ai ne d by calls to loyalty to a civil state.
In a heterogenous colony or new nation,

elites politicizing

ethnicity wou ld more likely emphasize factors of
dis si mil ar ity than factors of commonality.

Since appeals to

ethnic loyalty are divisive,

foster loyalty

to the civic state.

societies must

Geertz wrong ly assumes that,

ethnicity becomes dysfunctional,

since

societies will no longer

utilize it as a. m e c h a n i s m of unity.
While Dur kh eim and the strain theorists identified the
deep psychological roots of ethnicity,

they exagger ate d the

ability of governments to foster loyalties to the civic
state.

Alt h ou gh appeals to ethnic loyalties are often

divisive wi thin a state, many states have pe rs ist ed in such
appeals,

eq uiv ocating loyalty to the ethnic nation

often the dominant ethnic group's

identity)

(most

with civic

loyalty,

and p ol it ic iz ed ethnic identity among subordinate

groups.

The results are destructive because ethnic

15Geertz,

Old Societies and N ew S t a t e s . 112-7.
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identities were not as ma ll eab le as predicted.

The state

leaders did not create loyalties to the central ize d state as
strong as those that remained at tac hed to ethnic identity.
Like later primordialists,

Dur k he im and the strain

theorists essenti al ly v iew ed ethnic identities as
dysfunctional.

While the instrumentalists p or tra y ethnicity

as a tool of elites to combat a civic unity that is
disadvantageous to them, primo rdi al ist s p or tr a y ethnicity as
a psychological force that causes the same sort of
disintegration.

However,

if one views ethnic identity as

only a persistent relic of antiquity that complicates
modernization,

one implicitly criticizes those employing

ethnic ideologies as d i s i n t e g r a t i o n i s t s .

Primordialists and

instrumentalists alike do not take seriously the demands of
ethnic movements for cultural rights

(except as.obstacles to

modernization).

The Source of Conflict
The group drive to increase or m a in ta in status relative
to other groups is the dynamic that causes et hnic conflict,
according to the primordialists.
irrational reasons,

For both rational and

the fates of individuals are att ached to

their ethnic groups..

They gain economic advantages or

suffer disadvantages according to group membership.

Their
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ethnic identity will be p ass ed on to their descendants,

so

they wo r ry that their ethnic group might be releg ate d to the
position of "hewers of w o o d and water d r a w e r s . " 16
primordialists argue,

Thus,

they worry- about their group's

positio n within society.
Individuals also receive a sense of psychol ogi ca l worth
from the status of their ethnic group.

R.

Paul Shaw and

Yuwa Wong argue that humans have an inherent survival
m e c h a n i s m that connects them to their group.
mechanism,

This

which dev el op ed in the pre hi sto ric past for the

pro te cti on of kin and tribal groups,
modern w o r l d . 17

Individuals,

cha nnelled cognition,

is m is p l a c e d in.the

through a process of

commit loyalties to their ethnic

groups that evolution de signed for smaller g r o u p s . 18
Shaw and Wong envision this identification process as a
system of concentric circles of potential

loyalties,

with

the individual at the center and the civic state at the
outside ring.19

The factors that

influence at which level

an individual chooses to commit his or her loyalties are the

16Horowitz,

175-76.

17R. Paul Shaw and Yuwa Wong, The Genetic Seeds of
Warfare (New York: Unwin Hyman, 1988), 23-40.
18I b i d . , 65-68.
19Ibid. 107.
is also possible.

They note that identity with all hum ani ty
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same as those that are a ss oc iat ed with ethnic group
boundaries:

phen oty pic al characteristics,

common homeland,
descent.

Thus,

common religion,

common language,

and the belief in common

an identification m e c h a n i s m for the defense

of the pr eh is tor ic tribe creates a sense of al tru is m and the
tenden cy for se lf- sacrifice w ith in individuals that identify
with their- ethnic na ti on .20
Wi l l i a m Bloom,

another social scientist that related

theories of identification to examine nationalism,

expla ine d

the importance of the group identity to the sense of
security of individuals.

A change of "historical

circumstances," which threaten a "gener ali ze d identification
(such as ethnicity)" will also threaten the "identity of
each individual within that g ro u p . " 21

Sometimes,

20Shaw and Won g imply that the pr im ar y location for
these loyalties of m ode rn people is the nation-state.
W i l l i a m Bloom, Personal Identity. National Identity and
International Relations (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990) argues
that nation-states have an advantage even over ethnicity,
clan, tribe or sect, because they m o n o po l iz e the use of
force and are con sid er ed the nor m in mo de rn societies.
However, in a mo de rn iz in g society, this "norm" is not
u niv ers al ly ac cep ted and, thus, some states are unable to
direct the loyalty toward themselves and the loyalties of
their citizens remain committed to identities represented by
circles nearer the center, like ethnicity.
21Bloom,

39.
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individu al s are pr epa re d to die rather than "betray the
belie f and negate an iden tit y. "22
Portraying ethnic and national identities as mechanisms
of prehis tor ic social unity that have lost their meanings in
the modern era presents several problems.

For example,

the

primordialists need to account for w h y individual loyalties
shift focus from the small group or tribe to the nation or
state.

The former are collections of pe rs on al ly known

people,

while the latter imply a vast commu nit y of unseen

strangers.

To postul at e that such a shift has oc cur red on

an international scale,

primordialists must provi de a reason

for it.

if one assumes that archaic kinship

Alternatively,

ties are tr ansferred to modern nations,

wh y are they not

tr ansferred to ma n k i n d as a whole?

The Importance of the Ethnic Group
As a consequ enc e of the unique quali ty of ethnic
identity,

the status of an individual's et hnic group when

compared to other groups is often more important to that
individual's sense of belonging or se lf -e st ee m than his or
her relative status wh en compared to other individuals in a
so ciety.23

22Ibid,

People derive a sense of self worth from two

72.

23Isaacs,

34-36.
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sources:

their value as an individual and their value as a

me mber of a group.

Individual worth,

however,

is meaningful

only within an enclosure of a homogenous group,
oneself to one's comparable equals.

comparing

A n individual can

derive his or her worth from his or her personal
achievements,

but such "sources of belongingness and self

es teem serve only where basic group identity

(ethnicity)

differences do not get in the w a y . " 24
Thus,

the Chinese feel pride in their great past,

and

ex-untouchables of India do not escape feelings of
negativity.
sources,

People can derive self worth from different

and the relative esteem of ethnic group identity is

of utmost importance,
from all sources.25

but most people need all they can get

This aspect of ethnic identity accounts

for its political authority and the stakes involved in
loyalty to one's group.

The Invidious Co mparison Model
Donald Horowitz provides a model of how ethnic groups
formulate their identities,
ethnic identities.

an d their evaluations of their

He portrays

it as a confused and

complicated process that occurs during colonization.

24I b i d . , 34.
25Ib id. , 35.

As
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Europeans sought to govern their vast new territories,

they

ev aluated indigenous cultures, 'favored groups that
cooperated,
rule.

and sought the aid of these indigenous groups in

Groups that more easily a da pte d to European

domination became identified as "advanced,"
"reasonable."

"civilized," and

Groups that resisted wer e seen as "savages,"

and those who failed to adapt as " ba ck war ds ."26

This,

process created tensions among indigenous ethnic groups,
pretension among successful groups,

and resentment among

unsuccessful groups.
These ethnic evaluations were used by colonizers for
their own purposes,
peoples.

to divide and conquer the indigenous

Colonizers selected certain groups to assist in

administration,

staff the bureaucracy,

and fight in the

army.

They relegated others to menial tasks and manual

labor,

more fitting their pre sumed capabilities.

With time,

the pr esu me d cultural differen ce s among

ethnic groups became mag ni fi ed in intensity.

The experience

of success or failure as me as ur e d against European standards
strengthened the m e an in g of ethnic affiliations.
favored by Europeans,

Those

vi ewed as advanced and intelligent,

succeeded in a W e s t er ni z ed society and those v ie we d as
backwards and ignorant failed.

26Horowitz,

151-54.
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The colonialist thus set in mo ti on a comparative
process by whic h aptitudes and disabilities imputed
to ethnic groups were to be evaluated.
Those e v a l u 
ations, solidly ba s ed in groups disparities that
emerged, could not be di sm is se d as the irrelevant
invention of a foreign overlord.
Like the new
po lity and econo my in which the disparities were
embedded, the evaluations took hol d.27
Ethnic evaluations became se lf-fulfilling prophesies.
Ethnic groups'
colonizers,

pre s um ed differences,

became real to the indigenous ethnies.

As a result of this process,
assumed cultural traits.
included:

imposed by their

enterprising,

intelligent,

pushy,

ethnic groups d e v e l o p e d

Positive and adv anced attributes
aggressive,

cunning,

industrious,

ambitious,

a nd coarse.

Negative and backwards attributes included:
lacking initiative,
easygoing,

polite,

and pr o u d . 28

ignorant,

arrogant,

lazy,

indolent,

submissive,

dependent,

These traits became an important

element of each colonized person's ethnic identity.
A cco rdi ng to the invidious comparison theory,

the

memb ers of each ethnic group colle ct ive ly choose whi ch p r e 
mo der n traits to value and m ain tai n

(a society m a y view a

part of its identity as si mul taneously backwards and,

yet,

invaluable because it di ffe rentiates their group from
others).

Other ethnic markers a n d customs fade,

27Ib i d . , 164.
28Ib id ., 169.

victims of
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mo d e r n i t y . 29

The^ remaining group attributes determine the

success or failure,
g rou p.30

advanced-ness or bac kwardness of the

An individual

identifies hims elf or herself as a

me mber of an ethnic group,

his or her group's evaluations of

itself and the group's comparison to others becomes vital,
and he or she fights for the relative advancement of his or
her group.
The demand to catch up to other groups or m ai nt ai n
status in this system of "invidious comparison" between
ethnic groups creates ethnic conflict.
imagines,
community,

As Horowitz

colonization broadens the po lit y for an ethnic
bri n gi ng

it into contact with ethnic strangers

who have m as te r ed the skills of m o de rn it y b ett er than
itself.31

Backwards groups,

with severe anxiety about the

threats emanating from other groups,
face habitual s ub or di na tio n.32

push to catch up or

A dv a n c e d groups percei ve the

threat to their positi on and seek to mai n ta in the advantages
they have achieved; from modernization.

29I b i d . , 172.
30Ibid., 151-54.
Horowitz includes discussions of how
location, natural resources, and educational opportunity
also determine a group's status.
However, it is the
resulting evaluations of advanced-ness and backwardness that
causes conflict.
31I b i d . , 165-66.
32I b i d . , 173-76.
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In addition to the pr essure caused by the presence of
ethnic strangers,

membe rs of ethnic groups are pushed to

catch up by their own elites.

The se nti me nta lit y for

backwards traits often exhibi te d by former colonizers for
the "dignity,
peoples,

and nobility" of indigenous

finds no counterpart

to modernize,
h a b i t s . 33

politeness,

in the urges of their leaders

and assume advanced attributes,

The pursuit of group status,

and prestige that accompany it,

customs and

along with the power

assumes pr im ar y importance

to group members.
Individual
linked.

identity and group fate are inextricably

Members of groups strive to associate that group's

p r es um ed attributes to a positive identity.
Since the individual "sense of identity is the
feeling of being a wo rt hy person because he fits
into a coherent and valued order of things," ego
identity depends he av il y on affiliations.
A threat
to the. value of those affiliations pro duces anxiety
and def ense.34
Thus,

the struggle for status among the various ethnic

groups in a society takes on a deeply personal mea nin g to
the members of ethnic groups.

33I b i d . , 174.
34Ibid., 181.
Horowitz cites Alan 0. Ros.s, Eao
Identity and Social Order (Washington, D. C.: Ame ri c an
Psychological -Association, Psychological Monographs, no.
542, 1962)., 27.
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The stakes are high for ethnic groups trying to catch
up to their ad van ce d counterparts.
fear subordination.
descendants,

Members of ethnic groups

They do not want themselves,

their

and their fellow group members to become

relegated to low-esteem,

low-paying jobs.

Likewise,

they do

not want their ethnic identity to suffer low prestige in
comparison to other groups.

They tend to view conciliatory

leaders as excessi ve ly generous and even traitorous.
issue becomes a survival issue.

Every

The fear of extinction is a

powerful threat and a rationale for hostility.
Once ethnic evaluations,

v er bal iz ed and delineated,

sink in and take on a subconscious role in a society,
are an important determinant
evaluations,

in ethnic conflict.

ba s ed on stereotypes,

Following independence,

they

These

become culture.

political events highlight and

politicize these stereotypes.

Conflict betwe en groups

erupts in a struggle for pre-e min en ce in the society.

Summary
The primordialist approach to the study of ethnic
conflict keeps scholars attentive to the po wer of ethnicity
to overwhelm economic and class considerations.

Ethnic

identity links humans to their ancestral past as well as
their descendants'

future.

As such,

it holds a
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psycholo gi cal m ea nin g that surpasses the importance of a
single life or lifetime.

Simultaneously,

it links people to

a group whose collective social status holds deep,
subconscious relevance to the ethny member.

The social

strain of m od er ni za ti o n increases the need for both selfworth and finding emo ti ona ll y -l in ke d allies.
Pri mo rdi al ism also demonstrates that ethni c conflict
becomes so m u r d e r o u s l y intense and destru cti ve b ey on d the
economic goals of the elites and persistent b ey on d its uses
by the elites,
individuals.

because of the "unique" m ea nin g it holds for
Those mot i va te d by ethnic ideologies compete

not only for economic advancement,
pride in identity,

they also act out of

a fear of subordination,

the extinction of a va lue d affiliation.

and a horror for

This nonmaterial,

“ir rational” element of group identity in ethnic conflict
explains w hy elites and nonelites wi ll ing ly d es tro y the
■>

political and economic structures over whi ch they fight.
Primordialists account for the emotional po we r of the
"affective ties" of ethnicity that ins tru mentalists see as a
useful organizing principle.
employ ethnic ideologies,

Roughly speaking,

elites

which they ma y or ma y not feel

emotional attachment to themselves,

for their own purposes,

as an instrument of political organization.
psychological strength of ethnicity,

The

the implication of the
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individual's shared fate with his ethnic kin,
the masses

explains why

follow.

While, instrumentalists tend to exaggerate the
m a l l e ab il it y of ethnic identities,

primordialists do wnplay

the political ma nip ula ti on of ethnic boundaries.
invidious comparison model assumes that groups,
adjust to modernity,

The
as they

choose some primordial traits to value

and ma int ain as group identifiers,
With the fading of traits,

while other traits fade.-

ethnic boundaries broad en to

expand the size of the group.

Which traits are ma in ta in e d

and which traits are dropped determine which people are
included and which are exc lu ded from the identity.
is a conscious political act,
po lit ica ll y gains

If this

it begs the question of who

from the resultant

inclusions and

exclusion.
Also,

the pr imo rdialists rely upon some force to upset

the pre -modern social relations among e t h n i e s .
absence of an obvious influence,
modernization,

In the

such as co lon ization or

the primord ial is ts must explain what sets in

mo tio n the process of conflictual ethnic group comparison.
They account for the onset of the invidious comparison
process when colonization causes groups to jealously compare
themselves by the colonizers standards of "advanced-ness"
and "backwardness."

However,

how does this occur in
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industrialized countries which experience ethnic antagonism?
Whose values de ter mi ne the relative positions of groups?
Lacking their own explanations
of conflict bet wee n ethnies,

for the initial causes

the p ri mo r dia lis ts must rely

upon the theories of the conflictual m o d e r n i z a t i o n i s t s .
Finally,

the existence of strong identities in itself

does not ne cessitate conflict.

A strong sense of loyalty to

one ethnic identity does not require a n i mo si ty towards
another ethny.

Primordialists can n o t ■account

develo pe d ethnic identities,

which suffer ed from coloni ali sm

and are established in the primordial past,
experience violence.

for well-

but do not

CHAPTER'V
CONSTRUCTIVISTS

The third important school of ethnic conflict,
constructivists,

the

challenges the basic assumptions about the

formulation of ethnic and identity of the conflictual
mod ernizat ionist.s and the primordialists.

Other theorists

see ethnicity as a d ema rc ati on of confli cti ng groups or as
an instrument of political manipulation,

but the

constructivists believe that the creation of national
communities,

using ethnic identity as a basis

legitimation,

for

results in conflict..

The conflictual m od ern iz ati on ist s and the
primord ia lis ts share certain basic beliefs about ethnic
identity.

They both believe that identity is created and

re-created,

sometimes conscio us ly by ethnic elites or state

authorities

(as instrumentalists usually e m p h a s i z e ) , and

sometimes un co nsc io usl y among masses and elites alike,
limited by ascriptive ties
emphasize).

(as pri mordialists usually

Often, .according to instrumentalists and

primordialists,

ethnicity is politicized,
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crea ted or re-
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created in an ticipation of competition,

during competition,

or in res ponse to competition.
Constructivists,

however,

ide ntify the source of

conflict as the w a y in which et hn ic i ty is imagined.

They

agree that ethnic identities are creat ed and re-created
during conflicts.

However,

while others portr ay this

creation and re-creation as the result of the conflict,
constructivists port ra y the conflict as the result of the
creation and re-creation.
The question of the relationship be tw ee n conflict and
the ma ni pu lat io n of identity is m o r e than a simple "chicken
or the egg" debate.

Others assume that some other force

(modernization or colonization for the conflictual
m o d e r n i z a t i o n i s t s ) starts conflicts that set in mo tion the
creation and re-creation of identities
contracting "ethnic boundaries")
conflict.

However,

of the conflict
create,

(by expanding or

for advantages

in the

constructivists believe that the cause

is ,the political attempts to establish,

and re-create national identities.

The construc tiv is ts argue that nations m u s t 'develop,
construct,

identities that explain the unity of their

members beyond the simple legitimation of the civil state.
To persist in modernity,

nations an d ethnic nations must

create a consciousness of the greater nation such that the

or
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m e mb er s of the group perceive a common bond with others that
they never have met or never wi-ll meet.
as common culture,

language,

race,

ethnicity,

sense of history foster unification.
excluded from the national identity,
identities,

Social ties,

such

religion,

or

When individuals are
or drawn to alternative

the di vi ded society suffers competi tio n or

conflict.
According to the constructivists,

mo dern ethnic

identity is an ideology that results from intentional
political efforts and accidents of history.
languages,

drawing maps,

S ta nd ard izi ng

taking census and wr it in g national

histories constructs the social reality of a nation.

The

v ia bil it y and attraction of the constructed nation depends
upon its ability to estab lis h its legitimacy in history.
Nations and ethnic identities' define themselves,
sense,
Thus,

by what they are n o t —

in a

what is outside the identity.

some identities base themselves upon opposition to

outsiders.

Nine te ent h and twentieth century colonial

nationalists,

for example,

nations as "not European."

identified themselves and their
The o ut sid e- ins ide identity

relationship plays an important role in constructivist
theory of ethnic conflict.
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The National Mvth
Constructiv is ts assert that a nation-state must create
a national culture at some level if it is to survive.
"Nations need myths to live by," accor din g to James Mayall
and Mark S i m ps o n. 1

Ethnicities,

like ideologies,

varying capacities to attract followers.

contain

Ethnicities and

nations must establish themselves in the mythical past to
achieve legitimacy among their potent ial adherents.

The

communality of the group is cel ebr at ed in rituals and
symbols that are deliberate political

inventions to create

the essence of na ti on ho od .2
The ab il ity to construct a useable national myth
determines a nation's or an ethnic identity's viability.
For a nation-state,

the inability to create a national

culture and focus loyalties upon the centralized state
results

in conflict and secession.

of an ethnic culture,

Likewise,

the existence

or any competing identity that

attracts strong loyalties counter to the central authority,
causes a competition for legitimacy.

Strong identities

1James Mayall and Ma rk Simpson, "Ethnicity is not
Enough: Reflections on Protracted Se ces sionism in the Third
W o r l d , " International Journal of Compar ati ve Socio log y 33
(1992): 10.
2Eric H ob s ba wm and Terence Ranger, .eds., The Invention
of Tradition (Cambridge: Un iv ersity Press, 1983).
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challenge a state's le gitimacy and offer potential ethnic
nationalisms that we ak en its authority.
The works of Ernest Gellner,

Eric Hobsbawm,

and Terence

Ranger discuss ho w et hni cit y and the nation are imagined.
They write that the "historical" traditions of nations are
invented.

Nationalists promote symbols and historical

traditions that create a sense that the nation has existed
since the prehis tor ic past.
loyalty to it,

thus,

The nation and patriotic

are de fensible as respect for the past

and the practical acceptance of a historical
Accord in g to Gellner,

"na ti onalism is not the awakening

of.nations to self-consciousness:
they do not e xi st ." 3

"given."

it invents nations where

The nation-state s ys tem and modern

economies require nation-states.

Th ey are ne cessary for

international legitimacy and are the me ch ani sm s for legal
regulation of modern economies.
industrial society,

The imperatives of

which necessitate homogeneity,

societies to b eco me homogenous.

pressures

This pressure "eventually

appears on the surface in the form of n at i on ali ty ."4
Nationality,

then,

is a fabrication,

created by nationalists

to justify statehood.

3Ernest Gellner, Thought and Change
and Nicholson, 1964), 169.
4Gellner, Nations and N a t i o na li sm
Cornell Uni versity Press, 1983), 39.

(London: Wei denfeld

(Ithaca,

New York:
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In The Invention of T r a d i t i o n , Ho bsb aw m and Ranger,
emphasize the artificial nature of national

identity.

T r e v o r -R op e r5 points out that ma ny Scottish customs,
the kilt,

Hugh
such as

were actually the invention of late nineteenth

century nat io na li st .6

Falsified pasts were fab ric at ed in

ma n y ways and symbols of so-cal led national traditions were
presen ted as respect for the past and respect for the
historical roots of the nation.
Historical continuity h a d to be invented for
nationalism.

This was ac hi eve d through:

semi-fiction (Boadicea, Vercingetorix, Armin us the
Cheruscan) or by forgery (Ossian, the Czech medieval
m a n u s c r i p t s ) . It is also clear that en tir ely new
symbols and devices came into existence as part of
national moveme nt s and states, such as the national
anthem, the national flag, or the pe rs on if ic ati on of
'the nation' in symbol or image, either official, as
with Mar ia nne and Germania, or unofficial, as in the
cartoon stereotypes of John Bull, the lean Yankee
Uncle Sam and the 'German M i c h e l . ' 7
In the age of nationalism,

Europeans invented ma n y of the

p ubl ic symbols as so ci at ed with the nation.

.5Hugh Trevor-Roper, "The Invention of Tradition:. The
Hig hla nd Tradition of S c o t l a n d , " in Hob sbawm and Ranger, 1542.
6The kilt was imposed b y eighteenth century
Quakers who w ant ed their scantily clad Scottish
workers pro pe rly dressed.
It was later revived
British gentry by those who wa nt ed to advertise
hi gh la nd roots.
7Hobsbawm,- "Introduction:
Hob sba wm and Ranger, 7.

English
factory
among the
their

Inventing Traditions,"

in
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The invention of tradition was not limited to Europe.
Ranger describes how Af ri ca imported the concepts of. "the
tribe" and "the nation" from E ur op e. 8
Africa of the colonialist era,

Before the "false"

Ranger claims that there was

an Af ri ca where tribal identities were radically d if f e r e n t . 9
In another work,

Ranger describes ho w people speaking

dialects referred to as Shona were divided into hundreds of
tribes by the Rhodesian government,
Episcopal,

Dutch Reformed,

created the Manyika,

Jesuit,

and how Methodist
and Trappist mis si ons

Karanga and Zezuru l an gu age s. 10

The French National

Identity

The dominant way for nations to imagine or define their
nationality,

the French model,

eth nically heterogenous
nationalists,

n ec es sit ate d pr oblems for the

imitators that followed it.

during the French Revolution,

French

formulated a

8Ranger, "The Invention of Tradit io n in Colonial
Af ri ca ," in Hob sb aw m and Ranger, 211-262.
9An important debate.rages among constructivists.
They
argue whether, amid the co nstructed identities, there ever
were "genuine" nationalities.
A nd er so n criticizes the
usefulness of the "genuine-ness" paradigm, while Ho bsb aw m
and Ranger imply that "genuine" nationalities wo u l d not be
as problem ati ca l as the co nstructed ones.
10Ranger, "Missionaries, Migrants, and the M any ik a," in
The Creation- of T ri ba lis m in Southern A f r i c a , ed. Leroy Vail
(Berkeley, California: Un iv er si ty of California Press,
1989), 118-50.
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concept of nati onh oo d that envi si one d the legitimate nation
as a state g ov er nin g an eth nically homogenous,
p e o p l e . 11

sovereign

Others that tried to adhere to this model

discovered that the ethnies that were ex clu de d from the
national culture within their states cla ime d to be separate
peoples deser vin g their own state.
Benedict A n de rs on traces the fo rmulation of the French
model of an ethnic n at io n. 12

The leaders of the French

Revolution ad vanced a concept of the nation that included
those of European descent who spoke French as their first
language.

A dh ere nc e to this linguistic standard was

en for ced throughout the regions
control.

formerly under Bourbon

"Frenchness," speaking stand ard ize d French and

recognizing Paris as the central authority,

was violently

imposed by the Rev ol uti ona ry g o v e r n m e n t .
The French model of the homogenous and linguistic
"nation" entails a my thical attachment between the nativeborn speakers of the language that dominates a geographic
region and the land of that region.

Dom inant-language

speakers came to presume that e th nic all y and linguistically

u Liah Greenfield, Nationalism: Four Roads to Mo der ni ty
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard U ni ve rs ity Press, 1992),
91-188. Gree nfi el d discusses the formation of French ideas
of nationalism.
She discusses the role of Rousseau's
phi losophy on pages 172-77.
12Anderson,

Imagined C o m m u n i t i e s . 67-82.
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different peopl e did not belon g and that even learning the
language did not entitle one to enter into the national
community.

One neede d to be born into it.

The lexicographic revolution in Europe, however,
created and gradu all y spread, the conviction that
languages (in Europe at least) were, so to speak,
the personal pro pe r ty of quite specific groups-their daily speakers anqL rea der s—
and mo reo ve r
that these groups, imagined as communities, were
entitled to their autonomous place in a fraternity
of eq ua ls .13
Other nationalisms of the same era,

such as those that

arose in Germany as a response to the French invasion,
ass erted the French model of an imagined nation.
for a large part,

also

Germans,

defined their nationality in terms of

opposition to Fr an ce. 14

Important nationalist songs like

"Wacht am R h e i n ” emphasize that Germany arose in mil it ar y
struggle against the French.
because of it, Germans

Despite this,

or p o s si bl y

imagine their ethnic na tio na lit y in a

fashion similar to the Frenc h—

people of European descent,

born in a land called "Germany," and who speak German as
their first language.
Accord in g to constructivist theory,
ethnic homogeneity,
legitimate nation,

the imposition of

implied by the French mode l of a
and the demands for. n at io nho od by those

13I b i d . , 84.
14Hobsbawm, "Mass Producing Traditions:
1914," in Ho bsbawm and Ranger, 277-278.

Europe,

1870-
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who argue for the existence of their ethnic nation cause
ethnic violence.

States attempt to integrate and ho mogenize

their diverse po pulations to meet

international

standards of

nat ion hoo d and to eliminate potent ia l threats of separatist
or irredentist movements.

Ethnies,

whose elites created a

strong enough "imagined community" to survive,

resist

integration.

Other Models
Alt hou gh the French model do min at ed throughout the
twentieth century,

And er s on outlines other versions of

nationa lis m that existed.

The North Ame ri ca n model,

first nationalist movement,
Additionally,

the

pr e- d at ed the French model.

the regions affected by the collapse of the

Spanish Empire between 1810 and 1830 experi enc ed a style
different from Europe.

These models defined their

respective nations without ethnic descent.
North Ame ric an nation ali sm was qualitat iv ely different
from the French model.

Alt hough the leaders of the A m er ic an

Revolution were pr edo mi nan tly Protestants of English
descent,

inclusion in the nation was not base d upon ethnic

de s c e n t . 15
excluded,

Black slaves and indigenous peoples were
as were Catholics,

15Anderson,

and later Southern European and

Imagined C o m m u n i t i e s . 47-65.

A s i a n .i m m i g r a n t s .

Inclusion in the constructed national

community was not ba s ed upon one's ancestors'

presumed

inhabitance in the country since sup posedly everyone's
ancestors ha d imm igr at ed at some t i m e . 16

Unlike in France,

the descendants of immigrants could readily assimilate to
the dominant culture

(much more ea sily pro vi d ed they were

white P r o t e s t a n t s ) .

While white Protestants enjoyed ma ny

social advantages,

Americans

lacked a sense that being

"American" was rooted in a histori c connection to the land
or the dominant

language.

Those of European descent in Latin Am er ic a imagined
their nations in a similar fas hio n. 17
associated with the despotisms,

The nations

rebellions,

and civil wars

that followed the collapse of Spain shared w ith No rth
Amer ic a that,

so long as one could speak the language of'the

economic elites

(English in North America,

Spanish or

Portuguese in Central and South A m e r i c a ) , ethnicity was not
a barrier to inclusion within the nation.

Generally,

governments in the Western Hem isphere ruled in the name of a

16Note, however, that there is pre st ige attached to
one's family having long-term residence in the new world.
17Anderson,

Imagined C o m m u n i t i e s . 47-65.
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sovereign people

(though not necess ar ily democratically)

that was not e th ni ca lly e x c lu si ve .18
The nationalities of the following eras were imagined
in two different ways:
French ve r s i o n . 19

the anti-colonial vers io n and the

The nationalisms of the early twentieth

century,

those that followed the collapse of the Habsburg,

Ottoman,

Russian,

and Ch'ing empires,

of the post Wo r ld Wa r II eras,
bourgeois empires of France,

and the nationalisms

following the collapse of the

Britain,

Holland,

Belgium,

and

Portugal often followed the anti-colonial model of
nationalism.

However,

the leaders in these newly

independent states eve ntually forwarded the French,
linguistic,

ethn ic all y homogenous model.

The usual ly temporary thi rd version of nationalism,
dev e lo pe d among ethnic elites who had been d is cr im ina te d
against by Europeans,
nature.

was essenti al ly ant i-E ur ope an in

The "nation" in ma ny post-colonial

of all non-Europeans.

Ethnic elites,

as si milate to Western culture,

states consisted

who had a tte mp ted to

competed for jobs in the

18van den Berghe notes that indigenous peoples and
those of European or part-Euro pe an descent are vi sua lly
indistinguishable.
Pierre van den Berghe, "The Ixil
Triangle," in State Vi olence and E t h n i c i t y .e d . Pierre van
•den Berghe (Niwot, Colorado: Un iv ers it y Press of Colorado,
1990), 253-288.

193

19Anderson, "The N e w Wor ld Disorder," Ne w Left Review
(May- June 1992): 3-4.
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colonial bureaucracies.

Like the North Ame ri can and Latin

Am erican creole pioneers of earlier eras,

these indigenous

elites found that they were limited to lateral movements
within the bureaucracies,

and d en ie d the prestigious

promotions to the European cap i ta ls .20
"journeys"

In their frustrated

from post to post within the colonies,

these

elites met fellow ethnic "sojourners" who shared their fate.
Am o ng these elites,

the new form of n ati on ali sm arose.

And e rs on relates the story of Bipin Chandra Pal of
India in 1932.21

He was edu ca ted in England and subjected

to the same civil service exams as his England-born
competitors.

However,

regardless of how well he p er fo rme d

within a supposed meritocracy,

his ethnic identity

restricted hi m to work w ith in the Indian subcontinent.
Thw ar ted elites,

like Bipin Chandra Pal,

imagined a

community of "thousands and thousands like themselves,"
similarly fr ust ra ted .22

The social barriers against the

membe rs of their imagined commun ity convi nce d the elites
that they needed and deserved a nation of their own,
independent of the Europeans.

20An de r so n uses "creole" to denote native-born people
of European descent.
21Anderson,
22I b i d . , 77.

Imagined C o m m u n i t i e s . 92-93.
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To create the new "nationalities",
f i r s t ’imagin ed the community,
definitions of it.
elites

elites not only

they for mul at ed the

The attitudes of these nationalist

(" c u l t u r e - b r o k e r s " )23 shaped what ethnic markers —

language,

culture,

r e l ig io n s—

became included within the

boundaries and textures of the new identity.

Early on,

the

definitions were broa dly inclusive of non-E uro pe an ethnies.
Following independence,

however,

nationalisms that were

essentially anti-European evolved in the face of pressures
from ethnonationalisms among groups that forwarded a French
model of nationalism.

Former colonies lacked a "usable p r e 

colonial past from which a modern national m y t h
con str uct ed ."24

Separatist groups,

(could)

be

advancing an "ethnic

homogeneity" concept of the nation forwarded competing
claims to legitimacy.

M a n y of these groups were capable of

creating a national myth for their ethnic identity that
ques tioned the legitimacy of the central governments.

The

governments that sur vived often were ca ptu re d by groups that
enforced a linguistic,
nationalism,

ethnically hom ogenous model of

despite the reality of the ethnic identities

within the populace.

23Vail,

11.

24Mayall and Simpson,

10.
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Problems For The French Model
The imposition of linguistic and ethnic ho mog en eit y
along the French style of na ti on al is m causes the repression
of dissident ethnicities.
blame for the bloody,
less on the cruelty,

For example,

An de rs on places the

genocidal policies of the Khmer Rouge
paranoia,

and me gal om ani a of its Kh me r 

speaking leadership than on their efforts to follow the
models of the French and their national revolution.

The

inherent conflict between the Khmer Rouge's vision of
Cambodia and its ethnic reality resulted in a genocidal
campaign to prevent a challenge to nationalist rule.
The conflictual moder niz at ion ist s and the
primordialists that follow instrumentalist or pr imordialist
concepts of ethnicity often have diff icu lt y ex pl ai ni ng
instances of ethnic cooperation.

They can not account for

why and under what circumstances ethnic groups co-exist.
The ir theories fail to explain economic dispa ri ty and
competition between ethnic groups without conflict.

Nor do

they explain cases of w el l- est ab lis hed identities within the
same state that enj oy peaceful
Co ns tr uc ti vi s m accounts

relations.

for these cases by ex ami ni ng

the ways in which identities are constructed.
nationalisms,
language,

Inclusive

which do not exclude groups on the bases of

religion,

culture or race,

experience less
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violence,

because sep aratism and anti-state ethnic violence

develops "in a large part in reaction to insensitive
policies of the central a u t h o r i ti es ." 25

Exclusive societies

foster- dissent among those that do not share the identity
pr op agated in the national myth.
Con structivists propose that national identities,
formed to legitimize the state,

those

must be inclusive enough to

incorporate the potential ethnic identities within the
state.

Elites and collectives,

for reasons outlined in

instrumentalist and primordialist

literature,

m ay seek to

establish their legitimacy counter to the state's.

The

interplay betw een the national state's pro po s ed identity and
those alternatives to it determines the forces of ethnic
conflict and w he the r the different sides pursue violent
resolutions.

Constructivist

literature is rich with

examples of co mmu nit y identity formation and how those
formations affect

the viability of states,

levels of vio lence in ethnic conflict,

ethnies,

the

and the probabi li ty

of conflict resolution.

Mul tiple or powerful

ethnicities,

whether imagined or not,

and inflexibility by dominant or

subordinant groups are a constructivist's recipe for
persistent vi o l e n c e . 26

25Mayall and Simpson,
26Ib i d . , 14-18.

15.

Inclusive Nationalisms
Juan J. Linz offers a deve lo pin g form of communal
identity that suggests i nc lu si ven es s.27

He studied surveys

from the Spanish and French Basque regions,
Galicia,

Catalonia,

and Val encia and d et er min ed that traditional

nationalist movements offer primordialist conceptions of
nationalism,
However,

rooted in common ancestry and language.

often ethnic political movem en ts use a territorial

definition of identity in their drive for regional autonomy.
These nationalists shed their ties to their supposed
historical past,

reducing the "tensions imbedded in their

ethnic i d e ol og y, " and including "alien" ethnics

for

political ex pe di en cy. 28
Co nsidering the odds against India,
established ethnic groups,
because,

"since 1947,

with its numerous,

its leaders have succeeded

there has been a tacit underst and ing

that if the Indian state is to survive,

the government has

no alternative but to come to terms w i t h —
a c c o m mo da te —

di ve rs it y. "29

indeed to

India abandoned its early

27Juan J. Linz, "From Pr imordialism to Natio na lis m" in
New Nationalisms of the Devel ope d W e s t , e d s ., Edward A.
Tiryakian and Ronald Rogowski (Boston; Allen and Unwin,
1985), 203-53.
2SNewman,

471.

29Mayall and Simpson,

14.
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attempts to establish Hindi as its official
parti cu lar ly due to Tamil p r e s s u r e . 30

language,

Indian "nationality"

has come to be based upon commitment to a secular state with
a vast ma jo r it y of Hindus.

Thus,

a large part of the Indian

image of its nation ali ty rests upon the "most flexible
least overtly political)

(and

of the great wor ld re lig io ns ." 31

Efforts to create inclusive national communities often
fail.

Ethiopia might reduce ethnic and separatist violence

by forming a more coherent Ethiopian state,

rewriting its

history to show the common "Hamatic" tradition of Somalis,
Oromos, Amhars,

and Erit re ans .32

David Laitin points out

the advantages of various possible identities,

but concludes

that the colonial experience of the region has rendered them
im p o s s i b l e .33
The worse case scenario,

in constructivist theory,

the control of the state by a mono-cultural,
authority.

In these cases,

"nation-building" efforts,

is

intolerant

the dominant culture,

in its

is insensitive or deliberately

30Ibid.
31I b i d . , 15.
32David Laitin, "The Ogaadee n Que stion and Change in
Somali Identity," in State Versus Ethnic C l a i m s , eds. Donald
Rothchild and Vi ctor A. Olorunso (Boulder, Colorado:
Wes tv iew Press, 1983), 339-40.
33Ibid.
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belligerent to al ternative ethnic cultures and tries to
enhance the security of the state by el im in ati ng
"alternative foci of lo ya lty ."34
Dominant cultural elites in the society have been
able to pre serve their dominance through the in s tr u
ment of state power, and, to varying extents, the
process of the formation of the state has encouraged
the close link betwe en the ethnic na ti ona lis m of the
dominant group and state nationalism: the cultural
symbolism of the dominant group thus forming the
basis for the art iculation of state-national
identity.
The ethnic attachments of the dominant
community in such states is strengthened and t r a n s 
formed by its translation into state n a t i o n al is m. 35
This leaves other ethnies with the choice between
assimilating or resisting.
argued,

However,

as the primordialists

people sacrifice and die for their ethnic identity.

The det ermination of the dominant culture to absorb or
exterminate mi no rit ies

creates antithetical ethnic

nationalisms to oppose its efforts.

Summary
Often,

inflexible,

mo no-cultural regimes

fall into the

trap of seeing themselves as forces for mod er ni za ti on and
integration.

They perceive that their concept of the nation

34Ibid.

11

35David Brown, "Ethnic Revival," Third W o r l d Qu arterly
(October 1989): 8.
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is the adv an ced or mo der n v e r s i o n . 36
national identities,

consequently,

Alterna ti ve ethnic and

must be fragmenting and

disinte gr ati ng forces of primitiveness.

An der son cites

Indonesia's

"bloody integration" of East Timor betw een 1975

and 1980 .37

The regime in Jakarta pe rce iv ed and portrayed

its battle as one against "d is i n t e g r a t i o n i s t ,"
"separatists," and "anti-Indonesian elements."

Such

ideologies encourage leaders to believe, that they stand for
progress and peace,
nationalism,

while their adversaries represent narrow

sectio na lis m and terrorism.

Two trends emerge from the constructivist school's
theories on ethnic nationa li sm a nd ethnic conflict.

First,

ethnic n at ion ali sm arises in opposition to an oppressing
force.

Second,

legitimizing,

exclusive national

defining,

identities,

those

and enforcing the nation-state as an

et hnically homogenous community,

promote ethnic conflict.

The hist ory of n ati on ali sm shows that opposition
movements often develop ethnic nationalist
response to Oppression.

ideologies in

As Heribert A d a m wrote,

"People

establish their identity in op position to oppressors as the

36This m a y in part be because of the role of the social
sciences in examining ethnic conflict and na tio na lis m in
terms of modernity.
37Anderson,

"The N ew W o r l d Disorder,"

5-6.
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first step to real re si st anc e. "38

Am er ica ns developed a

na tionalism ba s e d upon a revolution against the British
monarchy.

German nation ali ty defined itself in milita ry

opposition to Na poleon's France.

Early nationalists in

Af r ica n and Asia n colonial territories, o rg an ize d themselves
as anti-European identities,

and,

later,

disenfran ch ise d

ethnicities within these states formed in opposition to
their central governments.
Constructivist theory emphasizes that nation-states
must recognize strong identities and ac c omo dat e diversity.
Regardless of the "falseness" or "genuineness" of an
identity,

forceful attempts' to homogenize societies create

resistance.

Ethnic identities opposed to the national

identity will be rei nforced or created in response to
oppression.

3SHeribert Adam, "The Ma nip u la ti on of Ethnicity." in
State Versus Ethnic C l a i m s , eds.., Donald Ro th ch il d and
Vi c t o r Olorunso (Boulder, Colorado: We s t v i e w Press, 1983),
139.

CHAPTER VI
KURDISH ET H NO NA TI ON AL IS M

Violent Kurdish ethnic na ti on al i sm threatens the
stability and territorial

integrities of Iran,

Turkey.

Kurdish nationalists claim.to

In these states,

Iraq,

and

represent a people that are lingu ist ica ll y and culturally
distinct from the dominant national gr o u p s —
Arabs,

and Turks,

respectively.

Thus,

Persians,

they conclude that

they, deserve their own ethnic state or,

at least,

recognition of their ethnic n ati on ali ty as distinct.
In each of these states,

the Kurdish peoples

a significant portion of the population.
numbers 'of Kurds are hi ghly controversial,

represent

Estimates of the
with states

unde rc oun ti ng and Kurdish nationalists exaggerating.
Nonetheless,

estimates place the Kurdish po pu lat ion between

18 and 20 mill io n people.
Kurdish descent

Between 4 and 6 m i ll io n people of

live in Iran

(out of 50 million c i t i z e n s ) ,

and roughly 4 million of Iraq's pop ulation
Kurds.

Turkey,

(12 million)

wit h between 8 and 11 milli on Kurds

(in a

pop ul ati on of 55 m i l l i o n ) , has the largest pop ulation of

93

are

94
ethnic Ku rd s. 1

Despite the numbers of Kurdish residents

within these states,

neither Iran,

Iraq,

nor Turkey are

prepared to grant statehood or even cultural autonomy to
their Kurdish population.
In spite of long- ter m efforts by these three states,
Kurdish n at io nal is m persists as a threat to their stability
and unity.
state,
people,

Since the formation of the Turkish national

its government has bru tally suppressed its Kurdish
outlawing their language and using the army to

enforce martial

law throughout the region.

Iran has crushed

several Kurdish rebellions and emp loy ed state terrorism
against Kurdish nationalist writers and elites.
also used state terrorism,

Iraq has

including the recent genocidal

chemical warfare tactics employed in 1988 against the town
of Halabja wher e 5000 di e d . 2

Nonetheless,

the Kurdish

resistance moveme nt s defy the state authorities.

The Kurds
A cc ord in g to most accounts,
the Medes,

the Kurds d esc end ed from

an Indo-European pop ulation group that mo ve d into

1Joel Krieger, ed., The Ox fo rd Compa nio n to Politics of
the Worl d (New York: Oxford Un iversity Press, 1993), 518.
2Nader Entasser, Kurdish Et h no na ti on al is m (Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Reinner Publishers, 1992), 138.
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the Iranian plate au before
and Tajiks,

600 B C.3

Like Persians,

the Kurds are an Iranian people.

the term "Kurd" denoted non-Arab nomads,
century BC,

it referred to all peoples

Mou nt ain regions of northwestern Iran.4

but,

Pushtus

Historically,
b y the seventh

inhabiting the Zagros
The Kurds

intermingled with other tribes and ethnic groups in the
area,

but their culture has remained distinct from those of

the surrounding regions.
The region's geogra phy has kept the Kurds separate from
the Arabs,

Persians,

and Turks.

Kurdistan sits on the

rugged and mountai nou s boundaries of the former Ottoman and
Persian Empires.

Historically,

both cultures v ie we d it the

natural bou ndary between them .5

Neith er culture pen etr at ed

Kurdistan long enough to assimilate the various tribes that
lived there,

and the Kurds remained separate.

Their mountains,
Izady,

according to the noted scholar Mehr dad

define the Kurdish people's identity and cu l t u r e . 6

The Kurdish saying "Level the mount ain s and the Kurds will'
be no more" demonstrates how the mo untains have pr ot ec te d

3M e h r d a d Izady, The Kurds: A Concise Han db ook
(Washington D.C.: Taylor and Francis, 1992), 3-4.
4Charles MacDonald, "The Kurdish Question in the
1980s," in Esman and Rabinovich, 234-35.
5Entasser,
6Izady,

3.

186-191.
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the Kurds from outsiders and sustained them throughout
h i st or y. 7

their

Kurds who have left the mountains are seldom

considered to be Kurds,

while members of other ethnic groups

that have settled in the mount ain s have become "kurdified
be yo nd all re cog n it io n. "8
However,

just as the mount ain s have sh ielded the

inhabitants of Kurdistan from outside influences,

they have

preven te d easy communication amo ng the Kurds themselves.
There is little communication or trade between Kurdish
communities.

Orga niz at ion has. tended to remain tribal,

and

the Kurdish l a n g u a g e .is divided into numerous dialects,

the

speakers of which can not communicate with other Kurdish
speakers.

Thus,

culturally and linguistically,

the Kurdish

society is fragmented and diverse.

The Kurdish Language
M os t. mo de rn nationalist moveme nts

recognize common

language as an important ingredient to the development of an
ethnic nation.

The Kurdish

language belongs to the Iranian

branc h of the Indo-European languages and,
fundamentally differs
Turkish,

from the Semetic Arabic and Altaic

and is similar to Persian.

7Ibid. , 188-89..
8Ibid.

thus,

It is,

however,
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distinct from Persian and un in t el lig ib le to speakers of that
language..

The mounta ino us terra in that isolates Ku r d i s h 

speaking groups and the lack of a central authority to
standardize the language have r ei nf orc ed linguistic
diver sit y among Kurdish speakers.
Al tho ugh there exist scores of subdialects,
two main dialects of the Kurdish language:
Pahlawan'i

(Dimili-Gurani) .9

Kurmanji,

there are

Kurmanji and

some subdialect of

which is spoken by most Kurds,

consists of two main groups

of subdialects:

(Bahdinani),

North Kurmanji

are 15 million speakers in Turkey,
and South Kurmanji

(Sorani),

speakers in Iran and Iraq.

Syria,

of which there

and the Caucuses;

of whic h there are 6 mill ion
North Kurmanji

is arguably the

literary language of the Kurds and is cons ide re d the most
prestigious.

Version s of Dimili,

also known as Zaza,

spoken by roughly 4 milli on Kurds throughout
Anatolia;

Iran,

are

Iraq,

and

and Gurani is spoken by the roughly 3 million

speakers of its two subdivisions,

Laki and A w r a m a n i . 10

These dialects are mu tu al ly exclusive and
unintelligible to speakers of. other dialects of Kurdish.
Writers of the Kurdish dialects even disagree about a common

9Some scholars refer to the ma jo r divisions, of Kurdish
as languages wi thin a Kurdish family of languages, rather
than as dialects of a single language.
See Entasser, 4-5.
10Izady,

167-75.
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alphabet.
alphabet,

Kurds in Turkey and Syria publish in the Latin
and m a n y Iranian intellectuals support this

practice.
Arabic.

Most literate Kurds in Iran,
A d d i t i o n a l l y the Kurds

however,

use the

in Ar me ni a an d the Caucuses

have publis hed in the Ar me ni a n alphabet since the 1920s,

and

some Kurds in the former Soviet Union use the Cyrillic
a l p h ab et .11

Despite the he ter oge ne ity of their language,

there exists,

among Kurdish nationalists,

a sense of a

common language.

Religion
Prior to the influence of Islam, most Kurds followed
the Persian religion of Zoroastrianism.
of Kurds are Muslims,
Sunnis.

the maj ority

three-fifths of w h o m are practicing

The S h i ’a sect of Islam,

also have significant

Now,

Judai sm and Ch ris tianity

followings among the Kurdish people.

There are followers of the A la w i t e sect of Islam,
heretical to the orthodox Muslims.
of Sufi orders.

Additionally,

Also,

considered

there are a number

a renewed interest in

Zoroastrianism devel ope d among intellectuals at the
beginning of the twentieth century.

“ MacDonald,

238.
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Yazidism,

an ancient religion of unknown origins,

has a significant
referred to as

following among the Ku rds .12

Yazidism,

"devil worship" by orthodox Muslims,

professes to be one of several

also

"cults of angels."

actually
It is

exclusive to Kurdistan and has only nominal roots, in Islam,
Christianity,

Judaism,

and easte rn religions,

but its rights

and practices are wholl y foreign to Muslims.

The History of Kurdish Na ti o nal ism
The m ode rn Kurdish m o vem ent s

in Iran,

Iraq,

and Tu rkey

have persis te d as problems for the central governments,

but

only posed serious threats to th e m when historical
circumstances or external

forces w e ak en ed the states.

h et er oge nei ty of the Kurdish language,
Kurdistan's terrain,
leaders,

The

region ali sm due to

political divisi ons among Kurdish

and the Kurds'

inability to unite at opportunistic

times have allowed the central go vernments to recover and
stabilize their regimes.

Af t e r infighting among the Kurds

or the withdrawal of outside support

further weakens them,

the th reatened state usually responds with brute force
against Kurdish civilians and soldiers.

12for dis cus sio n of the angel cults among the Kurds see
Izady, 137-58.
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Kurdish n a t i o na li sm began with the collapse of the
Ottoman Empire in the early twentieth c e nt ur y .13

The 1920

Treaty of Sevres envi sio ne d a Kurdistan gran ted local
autonomy with the prospect of independence wi thin a year,

if

the local pop ulation desired it and the League of Nations
Council re commended independence.
Sevres was never ratified,
■persist today,

Though the T re at y of

the as pirations that it aroused

represented in violent ethnic conflict in

Kurdistan.
Under Ottoman rule,

Kurdish rebellion e xi st ed as

resistance to the central authority,
nationalism.
Khan

rather than as ethnic

The revolts of the Baban

(1843-47),

and M i r Muh am m ad

(1806-8),

(1883-6)

of Badr

against the Turks,

and the revolt of Sheikh Ubaidella against the Persians were
"essentially revolts of traditional rulers wh o resented the
increasing encr oac hm ent s on their a u t h o r i t y . " 14

Alt hough

Ubaidellah tried to use nationalist rhetoric to find allies,
all these conflicts arose from indignation caused by

13Martin van Bruinessen, "Kurdish Tribes and the State
of Ir a n , " in The Conflict of Tribe and State in Iran and
A f g h a n i s t a n . ed. Richa rd Tapper (New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1983), 370-76. He discusses the relations of Kurdish
tribes to the Ottoman state as the beg innings of Kurdish
separatism.
14A rth ur Campbell Turner, "Kurdish N a t i o n a l i s m , ” in
Ideology and Power in the Middle E a s t , e d s . Peter Chelkowski
and Robert J. -Pranger (London: Duke U n i ve rs it y Press, 1988),
387 .
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taxation,

conscription and Kurdish

leaders being treated as

lesser pa r t n e r s . 15
Na t io na li sm is a W es ter n concept and was alien to the
cultures under Ottoman domination.

The Ottoman Empire based

its unity upon the common religion of Islam,

or "Ottoman

Harmony," a "view of the wo r ld and of history which was
shared by different religions and linguistic communities of
t h e .e m p i r e ."16

However,

some intellectual Kurds,

ex p ose d to

European ideas,

promote d n a t i on al is m as a means to preserve

their culture.

The newspaper,

K u r d i s t a n , began pu bli ca tio n

in 18 98 and Kurdish political and literary societies and
clubs were forme d. 17
Kurdish independence,

Some secret societies called for
but had little effect without the

support of the powerful tribal ch i e f s . 18
The close of Worl d W ar I of fe re d an op po rtu nit y for an
independent Kurdistan that ended with the disappointment of
the new Kurdish nationalist movement.

The influences of the

15Ibid.
16Yves Besson, "Identity crisis as a p a ra di gm of Middle
Eastern c o n f l i c t u a l i t y , " International Social Science
Journal 43 (February 1991): 137.
Na t io na li s m was a threat
to the Ottoman Empire and was the pr im ar y force responsible
for its collapse.
17Izady,

1958

59.

18M ari on Farouk-Sluggett and Peter Sluggett,
(London: I.B. Taurus, 1987), 178.

Iraq Since
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defeated Ottomans and the oc cup ied Persians over Kurdistan
evaporated and e nc ou ra ged Kurdish nationalists to push for
autonomy.

However,

Reza Shah took over the Iranian

rulership in 1921 and Mustafa Kemal's successful war of
independence re- est ablished autho rit y in Istanbul.
Kurdish hopes for an independent Kurdistan were further
damaged when the British created the Ara b -d om in at ed state of
Iraq and included the oil-rich pro vince of Mosul.

They

incorporated the largely Kurdish region within the new
state.

The Baghdad government would have had to respect the

Kurdish autonomy m a n da te d by the Tr eaty of Sevres,

but the

Allies and Kemal renegotiated the treaty and dropped the
issue of Kurdish independence in the Treaty of Lausanne.
In the po st-war period,

there were numerous small-scale

Kurdish revolts against the central go vernments in Iran,
Iraq,

and Turkey.

The fighting was most brutal in Turkey,

where the Turkish government at te mpt ed to "turkify" its
Kurds and mo ld the new state into an e th nic al ly homogenous
nation-state,
standard.

fitting the internat ion al ly legitimate

Alt h ou gh the Treat y of Lausanne required the

Turkish government to guarantee the religious rights of nonMuslims and the freedom of s pe ec h for non-Turks,
dec lared their nation the Republic of T u r k e y . 19

19Izady,

61.

the Turks
They banned
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all Kurdish organizations,
organizations,

including religious

and Kurdish publications.

Sheikh' Said led the first ma jo r revolt against the
central authorities in 1925,
Republican A m y .

and was crushed b y the Turkish

Other major resistance efforts by the

Kurds occurred during the Khoyboun revolt,
in 1932,

which was crushed

and the rebellion in the region of Da r si m in 1937.

It was also put down with great fe roc it y.20
Two revolts in Iraq demonstrate the difficulties for
Kurdish nationalist movements during this period.

In 1922,

Shayk Mahmud dec la red himself the king of an independent
Kurdistan under the banne r of the "Free Kurdistan Movement."
For the most part,

though,

he was unable to assert his rule

outside his home district of S ul ay ma nia .21
British and Iraqi forces,

he had to deal with Kurdish tribal

chiefs that o pp ose d his authority,
who denou nce d hi m as

Besides fighting

"feudal."22

and Kurdish intellectuals

Shayk M ahmud's revolt

resulted in the signing of the Tr eat y of Sadabad,
Iraq,

Turkey,

and Iran agreed to coordinate defense policies

against internal and external thr ea t s. 23

20Sluggett,

180.

21Sluggett,

179 and Entasser,

22Izady,

in which

64.

23Entasser,

54.

52-54.
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In 1927,

Shayk Ahmad,

rebellion against British,

a religious
Turkish,

leader,

began a

and Iraqi forces.

too faced the resistance of Kurdish dissenters.
a new religion,
Islam,

which combined Judaism,

him to Turkey,
him.

Eventually,

He promoted

Christianity,

as a m e c h a n i s m to unify the Kurds,

u ns uc ce ss fu l. 24

He

and

but was

British and Iraqi troops chased

where Turkish forces captured and arrested

Le adership of the Barzani c l a n ’s mi l i t a r y forces

p ass ed to Ahmad's brother, M us ta fa Barzani.

The Republic of M ah aba d
The 1945 Republic of Mahabad,

backed by the Soviets,

offered another chance at a Kurdish ethnic na t i o n . 25

Aft er

the occupation of Iran in 1940 by the British and the
Soviets,

the Iranian Kurdish movement seized the op por tu nit y

of the government's weakness to declare its independence.
President Qazi M u ha mm a d assumed the republic's civilian
leadership,

and Mustafa Barzani travelled from Iraq to join

as its m i li ta ry leader.
The republic,
without

however,

Soviet backing.

in exchange

24Izady,

lacked the abil ity to survive

When M o s c o w wit hd re w its support,

for promises of oil concessions

64.

25Sluggett,

183-86.

from Teheran,
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Iranian national forces attacked and crushed the Kurdish
re sistance.26
Barzani

They captured and e xe cu te d Qazi Mu ham ma d and

fled to the US S R. 27

The republic had lasted only

one year.

The Post Republic Era: The KDP in Iraq
Barzani returned to Iraq in 1958 after a group of army
officers led by Colonel Abdul Ka ri m Qas im overthrew the
mon a rc hy in Baghdad,.

The new government had a uneasy truce

with Barzani and his Kurdish De mocratic Party
used the Kurds against
Ba'thists,

its foes,

and the communists.

the

Barzani used the truce to
Qasim,

who was

con so li da te d his power and

began to perceive Barzani as a threat to the regime.29
negotiated with Barzani's Kurdish rivals,

He

most notably Jalal

Talabani and his Patriotic Union of Kurdistan

(PUK), and

2SEdmund Ghareeb, The Kurdish Question in Iraq
(Syracuse, New York: Syracuse Univ ers it y Press, 1981),
27Turner,

It

the Ar ab nationalists,

increase his au thority among Iraqi Ku rd s. 23
rumored to be an arabized Kurd,

(KDP).

12.

400.

28Entasser,

59.

29Izady, 67.
The officer's rebellion leaders were
originally friendly, if not openly sympathetic to the
Kurdish cause.
However, the arab nationalists among them
could not have' supported any change that w o u l d have wea ke ned
the Iraqi state.
Sluggett, 188.
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sought to neutralize the KDP.

The two sides fought to a

standstill until they signed a cease-fire in 1963,

agreeing

to cooperate against the Ba'thists and Ar ab nationalists.
In 1963,

an alliance b et wee n the Ba'thists and other

a nt i-Q asi m forces overth rew Qasim.
,Sa lam Aref,

a non-Ba'thist,

The new president,

pro m is ed the KDP Kurdish

aut onomy within the framework of an Iraqi state,
gain time to put down the communists.
withi n the KDP,

Abdul

in order to

Leftist elements

accusing Barzani of being. too

"feudal,"

thw arted attempts to improve relations with the shaky
re g ime .30
demands,

Aref,

accusing the KDP of ma ki ng impossible

sent the Iraqi army north to attack.

strengthen his authority within the KDP,
the Iranian g o v e r nm en t. 31

to

ac cepted arms from

Because of this tactic,

was viewed as a stooge of the Shah.
close ties with Iran,

Barzani,

Barzani

Af te r he establ ish ed

it be came less likely that Kurdish

rights could be rec ognized "within the framework of an Iraqi
s t a t e ."
When the Ba'thists o ve rth re w Aref's government

in 1968,

they also sought a truce with the Kurds in order to
consolidate their power.

As hap p en ed during A ref's rule,

the Iraqi government and the Kurds could not agree upon

30Entasser,
31Turner,

65.

4 01.
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terms and returned to armed s t ru g gl e. 32
the backing of the Soviets,
from the CIA,

The Ba'thists had

while the KDP received weapons

Israel and Iran.

Unf or tu na te ly for the KDP,

their powerful allies only

supported them as a means to d es ta bi liz e the Iraqi
go v er nme nt. 33
undesirable,

They con sidered outright Kurdish victory
since it would incite nationalist sympathies

among Iranian Kurds.
Agreeme nt in 1975,
Ba'th government,
Teheran,

After the Shah signed the Al gie rs

he stopped supporting the Kurds.
bolste red by its rapprochement with

attacked the unsuppo rte d K u r d s . 34

Kurdish villages,

It destroyed

arresting and killing civilians and began

a policy of "arabization" of its Kurdish regions.
again,

The

Kurdish hopes had been raised,

Once

only to end in

b rut ali ty against civilians.

The Iranian Revolution
The 197 9 Iranian revolution pre se nt ed the Iranian Kurds
with their first op por tu nit y for independence since the

32Alt ho ugh they signed an agreement- that the Kurdish
language woul d have the status of a national language
alongside A rab ic and that there wo u ld be a Kurdish Vice
President, neither side took this agreement seriously.
Entasser, 70.
33Entasser,
34Izady,

68.

71.
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M a ha ba d Republic.
Party of Iran

The long-sup pre ss ed Kurdish Democratic

(KDPI)

and the Komala took advant ag e of the

chaos in Teheran to create a local autonomous
Iranian Kurdistan.
order,

zone for

Once the Islamic Republi c re-es tab li she d

it m o v e d against the Ku rd s.35

Claiming that the KDPI

and the Komala were attempting to disme mbe r Iran,
discred it ed them as a n t i - I s l a m i c .36
Kurds,

It allied wit h other

including Barzani and some tribal chiefs,

attacked.

it

and

Teheran was willing to accept m i n o r i t y rights for

religious groups,

but unwilling to grant rights ba s ed upon

non-Islamic principles.

The Iran-Iraq War
Although it br ut al ly suppressed its own Kurdish
nationalists,

the Iranian government suppor te d Iraq's Kurds

against Baghdad during the Iran-Iraq War.
att acked Iran in 1980,
Teheran,

the KDP,

A f t e r Iraq

with its hea dq uarters

in

received arms and the support of the Iranian army.

A l th ou gh the wa r bogged down in the south,

Iran's most

successful offensives were aided by Kurds in the North.
In desperation,
Kurdish group,

35Izady,

Talabani's PUK,

69.

36Ghareeb,

S ad da m Hussein pro m is ed the KDP's rival

16-17.

terms that were mo re generous
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than those Barzani had been given in 197 0—

regional

au to nom y in northern Iraq and a budget equivalent to 25-30
p e r c e n t - o f 'the Iraqi state b u d g e t . 37

It is doubtful that

Hussein p la nn ed to keep his promise,

but the alliance helped

him counter the Iranians.38
Af t e r the war ended in 1988,
upon the Kurds.

Hussein sought revenge

Iraqi troops fought the KDP,

"scorched earth" po li cy against

its Kurdish regions.

bu ll doz ed and dynami te d buildings,
and used chemical weapons.

employing a
They

poured cement down wells,

In the most gruesome use of

chemical weapons since Wor ld War I, the Iraqis
civilians in the city of Halabja in 1988 .39

killed 5000

The Kurdish

insurrection collapsed within a year.

The Gulf War
The A ll ie d vict ory during the 1991 Gulf War,

began the

most recent era of Kurdish nationalism.

Following the

Ba'thist's defeat,

a coalition of Kurds,

including the KDP

and the PUK who were tentatively allied,

seized control of

the Kurdish regions of'Iraq,

while the Iraqi Republican

Guar d was bu s y suppressing a Shiite rebellion in the south.

37Izady,

69.

38Entasser,

132.

39I b i d . , 138.
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As soon as it finished,

however,

crushed coalition forces,

it attack ed the Kurds.

while nearly 1.2 million refugees

fled to Iran and 500,000 fled towards T u r k e y . 40
forces,

mostly British and American,

retreat' and genocide,
the 36th parallel.

It

The Al lie d

tri ed to stop the mass

establishing a no-fly zone north of

Withi n this region,

the Kurdish

coalition de clared a Kurdish Federated State under the
leadership of the PUK and the KDP.
To the chagrin of the West and its ally Turkey,

the

declar ed Kurdish Federated State has e nc ou ra ged Kurdish
nationa lis m in that state.
reversed the government's
towards its Kurds.

In Turkey,

Turgot Ozal had

lifelong po li cy of oppression

It no longer insisted that Kurds were

"Mountain Turks," and,

in February of 1991,

linguistic righ ts. 41

Also,

the Iranian New Year

(N e w r o z l . the most

it granted them

it re cognized the celebration of
important Kurdish

holiday.
Despite the relative relaxation of its Kurdish policy
in the state,
Turkey,

the main Kurdish nationalist movement

the PKK

Worker's Party)

(Partiya Karkaren Ku r d i s t a n — Kurdish
grew.

Formed in 1979,

the PKK gained

strength from Turkish government suppression.

40Izady,

in

Ankara,

70.

41Christian Science Monit or

(February 7 1991),

p. 5.

Ill
hoping to destr oy the Marxist guerilla movement,
local Kurdish mi litias against
police and the militia,

it.

raised

The b rut ali ty of the

forced local civilians to chose

between the government and the PKK.

Many chose, the PKK. 42

The p ost -Gu lf War rise of Kurdish ethnic na t io na li sm
has proven to be a greater challenge to the Turkish
government than to the war's

loser,

Saddam H u ss ei n .43

The

existence of a de facto Kurdish state in nor the rn Iraq has
arou se d nationalist
Kurdish populace.

sentiments among Turkey's southeastern
Also,

PKK guerrillas have used the no-fly

zone as a hideout from wh ich to launch attacks against the
Tu r kis h government.
send forces

The Turkish army has repe ate dl y ha d to

into northern Iraq after them.

While the foreign minist er s of Turkey,
(a long-time supporter of the PKK)

and Syria

agreed to coordinate

their policies toward Kurdish nationalism,
the Kurds is not u ni f i e d . 44

Iran,

the leadership of

Ab d u l l a h Oc.alan,

the leader of

42Eric Rouleau, "The Challenges to T u r k e y , " Foreign
Affa ir s 72 (October 1993): 124.
■43James Brown, "Turkey's Kurdish Imbroglio," Annals 541
(September 1995): 116-29.
Brown argues that Turkey
ultimately m a y suffer more from post-Gu lf War changes than
Iraq.
44Robert Olson, "The Kurdish Question and Geop oli ti c
and Geostrategic Changes in the Mi ddle East after the Gulf
War," Journal of South Asi an and Mid dl e Eastern Studies 17
(Summer 1994): 46.

112
the PKK has den ou nc ed both Ma so ud Barzani

(Mustafa's son)

and Talabani as traitors to all K u r d s . 45

The leaders of the

Kurdish Federated State,

have cooperated

for their part,

with the Turk ish government in its fight against

the PKK,

disdaining the use of their autonomous zone for use against
Turkey,

whose Incirlik Air Base is essential to the

ma int ena nc e of the protection

zone.46

Summary
The history of Kurdish n ati ona li sm has been the
repetition of a patt ern which is not likely to end.
nationalists have only had success in Iran,

Iraq,

Kurdish

or Turkey

during periods of instability for the central government.
During chaotic periods,
Ankara,

the governments in Teheran,

Baghdad,

or Istanbul have used different tactics to reduce

the threat of Kurdish nationalism.

They have negotiated

temporary truces with Kurdish movements,

which the Kurdish

leaders accepted in order to strengthen themselves within
Kurdistan.

The Kurds have been unable to unify and the

central governments have reasserted their authority.
they have fostered feuds among the Kurdish leaders.

Also,,
Kurdish

interests have fought among themselves or allowed themselves

45Christian Science M o n i t o r . 13 Augus t
4601son,

48-49.

1991,

4.
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to be used by outside powers against w hi che ve r group
ap peared to lead Kurdish ethnic nationalism-

When the

central governments r e-e st abl ish ed authority,

they renege

upon any promises made du ring times of instability and take
revenge upon Kurdish groups, and civilians.

CHAPTER VII
THE KURDS A N D THREE' AP PR OAC HE S TO ETHNICITY

The two dominant

schools of ethnic conflict,

the

conflictual modern iz ati on ist s and the p r i m o r d i a l i s t s ,
provide insight into the forces that exacerbate the ethnic
violence in Kurdistan.

.Conflictual modernizationists-

identify the economic disparities b e tw ee n the peoples of the
Kurdistan and their respective economic centers in Iran,
Iraq,

and T u r k e y as factors that deepen ethnic ha t r e d . 1

Likewise,
Kurdish,
deep,

the primordialists make a case for strong,
Persian,

Arab,

and Turkish

ps ychological loy alties.2

valued

identities that command

A lt ho ug h they have

identified forces that worsen the conflict and hinder its
resolutions,

neither school isolates the root causes of the

conflicts.

U o a n e Nagel, "The Conditions of Ethnic Separatism:
Kurds in Turkey, Iran and Iraq," Ethnic it y 7 (September
1980): 279-97.

The

t h r o u g h o u t Ethnic Groups in C o n f l i c t , Horowitz
portrays the Kurds in Iraq as a prime example of a
stigmatized "backwards" identity and a prime candidate for
secessionism.
11.4
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The constructivist approach to ethnic conflicts reveals
the source of vi olence.in Kurdistan and accounts
that thwart the unification of the Kurds.
Iran,

Iraq,

for factors

The inability of

and Tu rk ey to create national communities that

include the Kurds,

and these states'

suppressions of the

Kurdish identity caused Kurdish nationalism.

However,

the

Kurds have been unable to unify because of their linguistic
and religious diversity,

and their divid ed leadership.

The

governments have ut ilized this di sunity to counter the
threat to their states and ethnic vio lence has persisted.
An examination of economic variables that influence
ethnic conflict illustrates

important factors in the

pe rsistence of violence in Kurdistan.

The de pe nde nc y model

of region al ly- di ffe ren ti ate d ethnic groups describes the
conditions among Kurds.

They suffer from economic

discrimination along ethnic lines and,
demands

thus,

justify their

for autonomy in terms of economic grievances.

However,

evidence shows that the conflictual

moder niz ati on ist s misinterpret the situation in Kurdistan.
First,

conflictual mo de rni za tio n theory assumes that ethnic

conflict

results from attempts to re-establish social order

after traditional structures have collapsed und er the
pressures of modernization.
traditional

In Kurdistan,

however,

social structures have remained intact,

and are
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the sources of power for many ethnic elites.
conflictual mo der ni zat ion is ts

Second,

the

suppose that disgruntled,

mod e rn iz ed elites will.polit ic ize ethnicity.

This

assumption ignores the importance of traditional elites who
oppose assimilation in Iraq and Iran and who cooperate
Turkey.

Finally,

in

the conflict betw een Kurds and their

ethnic neighbors began prior to the mo de rn iz ing influences
of state programs and,
modernization.

thus,

could not have re sulted from

While the conflictual mod ern iz ati oni st

scenario ap pro ximates events in Kurdistan,

it fails to

account for the origins of ethnic violence.
Ethnic identities
well-developed.

in the M idd le East are ancient and

Primordialists claim that such identities

have a psyc ho log ica l strength that defies rational,
explanations.
identities

The Kurdish,

Persian,

involved'in the violence

Arab,

economic

and Turkish

in Kurdistan consist of

the ethnic markers that pr imo rdialists claim will command
loyalty and self-sacrifice.

The psycholog ic al appeal of

ethnic org anization in the region and the wi llingness to die
for,

or commit atrocities

in defense of these identities

plays an important role in'the' vio lence in the region.
However,

while primordialists explain the irrational

de st ructiveness of the violence and its tendency to persist
over generations,

they offer no suggestions concerning the
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cause of conflict.
do not,

Well-developed,

of themselves,

di ff er en t ia te d cultures

necessitate violent conflict.

Thus,

theorists that apply primordi al ist explanations to ethnic
conflict must resort to economic explanations to account
the origins of violence.

for

Neither of the two dominant

schools reveals the source of the conflict

in Kurdistan.

Conflictual Mod er niz ati on and the Kurds
Of the two competition models,
the dep endency model,

the ecology mode l and

the latter best describes the

conditions among the Kurdish peoples
Iran,

Iraq,

and Turkey.

in the p eri ph eri es of

Direct economic competition,

pr op os ed by the ecology model,

does not apply to the Kurds.

Kurds who leave Kurdistan to join the central economies of
Iran,

Iraq,

cultures.

and Tu rke y usually assimilate to the dominant
Ac co rd in g to Izady,

"the list of natur all y

assimilated Kurds is a long on e . " 3
leader of the National
in Iraq,

Ka ri m Sanjabi,

Front Party in Iran,

the

President Qasim

and General Kenan Evren in Turkey are on l y some

examples of Kurds wh o have shed their ethnic identit y and
succeeded within the dominant c ul tur es .4

3Izady,

Most of the ethnic

110.

4Ibid., 110.
S add am Hussein himself is pa rt ly Kurdish
through his father's family.
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vio le nce in the Kurdish conflict relates to the c o r e 
periph er y relationships between the Persian,
Turkish centers and the peripheries

Arab,

and

in Kurdistan.

D e pe nde nc y theory's depiction of regionally different
rates of mo de rn iza tio n describes conditions in Iran,
and Turkey.

Iraq,

The Kurdish regions in all three states suffer

from economic underdevelopment relative to the regions of
the dominant ethnic g ro up s. 5

The policies of the central

governments have prevented the Kurds from be ne fit tin g from
the natural resources of Kurdistan.
the most va luable export,

has been devel ope d to the

advantage of the central economies.
Khanaqin refineries in Iraq,
Turkey,

for example,

Petroleum refinement,

At the Kirkuk and

and the Batman refinery in

the only help to the local economy is

jobs for u ns kil le d labor ers .6

The exportable,

m a n u f ac tu re d

goods of Kurdistan are limited to souvenir handicrafts and
artwork.7
In Iran,

uneven mod ern iz ati on d uri ng the Pahlavi

m o na rc hy res ult ed in ethnic inequality.
control of agriculture,
of their land.

The government took

pushing Kurds and other peasants off

'Periphery ethnies pr ov i de d the low-paid,

sNagel,

280-81.

6Izady,

232.

7I b i d . , 231.
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unskil le d labor force emp loyed in the mo na rch y' s housingconstruction and road-building p r o j e c t s . 8

As a result,

\

Kurds have rem ained poore r and less edu cat ed than Persians.\
Only 2 0 percent of the homes in Kurdish regions have
electricity,

compare d to 87 percent

in Persian regions,

and

the Kurdish literacy rate is only 30 percent compared to. 66
percent in Persian p r o v i n c e s . 9
The Ba'thist government's ma in development projects

in

Iraqi Kurdistan have been limited to the construction of
"cluster villages" and roads.

Kurdish intellectuals have

criticized these projects as self-inte res te d on the part of
Baghdad.

Ac cor din g to critics,

the government built the

"cluster villages" of compact housing for the residents of
K u r d i s t a n .only to isolate the guerrillas from the local
populace,

and to facilitate the mon ito ri ng of the Kurds.10

The roads ease the mo bil iz at io n of the Iraqi army against
the Kurdish rebels.
The situation is similar in Turkey,

where, the rapid

economic.growth that be ne fit te d the cities on the Aegean and

8Entasser,' 6-7.
9Akbar Aghajanian, "Ethnic Inequality in Iran,"
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 15 (May
1983): 216. in Entasser, 7.
10Entasser,

8.
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Me di te rr an ea n coasts byp ass ed the rural so u t h e a s t . 11

The

per capita GDP of Kurdish regions is less than half the
national average and unemployment
percent,

twice the national average.

literacy rate is 77 percent,

*

is estimated at 25
In a state where the

the literacy rate among the

Kurds is only 48 p e r c e n t . 12
The people inhabiting the Kurdish regions of Iran,
Iraq,

and Tu rk ey suffer from economic hardship di st rib ut ed

along ethnic lines,
have few avenues

a cultural division of labor.

for economic advancement.

are co mparatively "backwards" and feudal.

The Kurds

Their regions
These conditions

foster the sense of a prosperous center "colonizing" and
ex pl oiting the po ver ty -st ric ke n periphery.
Despite the a ni mo sit y caused by economic differe nc es
between ethnies,

the dep endency model m is in te rpr et s the

source#of the conflict.

Co mpetition theorists assume that

economic dispa rit y and competition cause conflict.
they find a "core-periphery" relationship,
they have found the source of conflict.

Once

they assume that

Joane Nagel,

a

conflictual m o d e r n i z a t i o n i s t , tried to explain the ethnic
conflict in Kurdistan with de pe nde nc y theory,

but could not

u Philip Robins, "The Ov erl ord State: Turki sh policy
and the Kurdish i s s u e , " International Affairs 69 (October
1993): 663.
12I b i d . , 663.

account for the pe rsistence of vio lence there in terms of
economic v a r i a b l e s . 13

She resort ed to citing the level of

or ga nization among Kurds,

and extra-national

involvement in

the conflict to supplement the dep e nd en cy model's
explanation of persistent

sepa ra tis m among Ku rd s. 14

Al th oug h economic diffe re nti ati on provides Kurdish rebels
with grievances against the central governments,

it is not

the source of the conflict.

The Destruction of Social Order
Conflictual mod ern iz ati on theory assumes that
mo d er niz at ion destroys traditional
Accordingly,

social order.

old structures of aut ho ri ty recede in

importance during modernization.

Elites must compete for

positions of political power,, while economic displacement
makes nonelites susceptible to appeals to ethnic identity.
Ethnic elites politicize ethnicity for their own purposes,
and nonelites follow.

However,

mode rn iza tio n and the

destruction of social order has not occ ur red in Kurdistan.

13Nagel,

279-97.

14Ibid., 289-93.
As shall be d i scu sse d later,
organization (disorganization) among the Kurdish, separatists
benefits the central governments and milit at es against
persistence by the separatists.
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The Kurdish regions of Iran,

Iraq,

and Tu rkey remain much as

they were before the creation of these states.
The economic infrastructure of Kurdistan has only
changed slightly and its pr e-modern social structure remains
intact.

Aft er the 1932 Shayk Ma h m u d revolt was put down,

tribal leaders as serted their po litical p ri mac y in the
absence of local competition.
and guerrilla forces.

They f o r m e d .political parties

Kurdish leaders use names that imply

mo dern political parties,

but their le gitimacy as rulers

depends upon their authority as tribal and clan leaders.
Almost anyone of political importance carries a
tribal surname.
Jalal Talabani, M u st af a Barzani,
Ma so ud Barzani, Rasul Mamand, and A bd ul -Ra hma n
Qassemlou all of wh o m carry the names of their
respective tribes are only the best kn ow n. 15
The highest focus of loyalty for the ma j o r i t y of Kurds
remains the traditional tribal political

structures.

The governments of Iran and T urk ey have undermined,
some extent,

to

the. traditional structures of authority in

their Kurdish regions,

and the Kurdish resistance movements

there reflect the differences relative to the conditions in
Iraq.

The KDPI in Iran is less tribal than either the KDP

or the PUK.

It is made up of mo st ly urban el-ites, but

maintains its ties to the traditional tribal structures,

15Izady,

205.
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which remain intact within Iranian K ur d i s t a n . 16
is a mor e modern,

socialist organization,

but,

leftist and mod er a te ly leftist organizations,

The Komala
like other

it has also

needed its connections with tribal structures.

Alt hough

they are less dependent upon the tribal leadership,
Kurdish mo vements

in Iran benefit

the

from the intact structures

of traditional or d e r . 17
In Turkey,

the government has suppo rte d some

traditional structures wh i le undermining others.

The

Kurdish regions of the Turkish Republic remain semif eu dal .18

The government backs

recruits the Vi ll ag e Guards
loyal to the st a t e . 19
officer,

local Kurdish landlords and

from among clans that remain

Acc or di n g to a Turkish mil it a ry

"Half the men join the PKK.

The other half move to

the cities where they become mi l i t i a . " 20

Kurdish loyalties

remain divided between their commitment to clan structures
and the appeal of the modern,

Marxist PKK.

The PKK is the only Kurdish political pa r ty that
independent of tribal structures.

16Ib i d . , 207 .
17I b i d . , 210.
18Robins,

663.

19Ib i d. , 664 .
20Rouleau,

124.

is

It fights against the
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T ur ki sh -or gan iz ed Villa ge Guards and its Mar xis t- Len in ist
ideology is ai med as mu ch at the defeat of local
as the Turkish go ve rn me nt .21
Ab dullah Ocalan,
Talabani

in Iraq,

Nonetheless,

landlords

Its leader and founder,

de nou nc ed the f eu da lis m of both Barzani and
calling them traitors to all K ur d s . 22

even in Turkey,

the pre- mo der n social

structures play an important role in the co nfl ic t.23
Nagel notes the difficulties of ex pl ani ng ethnic
separatism' in Kurdistan by the d est ru cti on of social order
through penetr ati on of the periphery.
theory,

A c c or di ng to their

conflictual mo de rn iza ti oni st s expect that "the

greater the de gre e of penetr ati on of a pe ripheral ethnic
group by the central state,

the greater the likelihood the

group will engage in separatist ac t i o n . " 24

However,

separatist vi olence in Kurdistan occurs in the absence of
penetration.

21Micha el G unt er "The Kurdish Problem in T u r k e y , "
M idd le East Journal (Summer 1988): 392-98.
Gunter credits
the out law ed status of both Kurdish nationalists and leftist
org anizations for the leftist leanings of Kurdish
nationalism, since both ideologies can alt er nat ive ly be used
to oppose the Turkish state.
22Christian Science M o n i t o r . 13 August

1991,

4-.

^

23Van Bruinessen, 372.
Van Bru inessen notes the
importance of the tribal leaders and the ma in te na nc e of
tribal structures to the government's indirect rule of the
region.
24Nagel,

285.
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It was the moment of greatest weakness, not strong
penetration, that the Kurds chose to launch their
republic (Mahabad)—
a strateg ica lly wise move that
indicates the limited usefulness of p ene tra ti on
(modernization) ex pla nations of s e p a r a ti sm .25
Conflictual m od er niz ati on ist assumptions of the
destruc tio n of old order as a pre -c ond iti on of conflict miss
the importance of the tribal and clan leaders in the ethnic
violence in Kurdistan.
of traditional

Mo de rni za tio n and the displacement

leaders has not occurr ed to the extent

necessary to cause ethnic conflict.

Kurdish nationalist

leaders are not vying for new positions of aut ho r it y within
a enl arged polity.

Rather,

for the most part,

they rely

upon old structures of power as a means to resist the
central governments.

Elites and Their Motives
As shown by the persist enc e of tribal and feudal
structures,

the ma ke up of the Kurdish eth no nationalist

elites defy the descriptions of the conflictual
mo d er ni zat ion theorists.

The dis gru nt led elites of Smith's

The Ethnic R e v i v a l , and the ec ono mic al ly -m ot i va te d elites of
Rogowski's rational-choice model are not present
Kurdistan.

25I b i d . , 289.

in
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Al th ou gh they are Western-educated,

it is inaccurate to

portr ay Kurdish elites as d is gr unt le d bureaucrats.
important

The most

leaders of Kurdish resistance mo ve men ts all

received degrees from mo dern universities.
for pos si bly Ocalan,

However,

except

they did not fail to find po sitions of

authority w it hi n the state and decid e to incite ethnic
unrest.

Rather,

they used their familiarity with Western

ideas to enhance their existing a ut hor it y as leaders and to
increase their ability to resist the central governments.
Ocalan most closely fits the m o d e r n i z e d •ethnic elite
env isioned in The Ethnic -Revival.

He formed the PKK after

gaining an education in Political Science at the Uni ve rs i ty
of Ankara.

While he did not fail as a bureaucrat,

he

app arently felt a sense of d isc rim in ati on against Kurds
while at college and began criticizing Turkish o p p r es si on .26
He was jailed for his opinions and turned to pr omo ti ng
ethnic separatism.
Only the dominant Kurdish movement

in Tu rkey reflects

the conflictual m o d e r n i z a t i o n i s t s ' portrayal of likely
ethnic leaders.

The mo tivations of Kurdish elites do not

mat ch the materia lis t motivat io ns of their scenarios.

An

insightful comment of Paul Brass applies to the situation
Kurdistan.

26Mango,

988.

in
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The objective or subjective p er ce pt ion of inequality
is indispensable to justify nationalism, but it is
not in itself a ^ e x p l a n a t i o n for it.
The only
certainty is tfo>pvery nationalist mo vement has
always justifie
pbelf in terms of existing op pr es
sion by a rivalry ro up. 27
Kurdish nationalists use economic grievances to justify the
conflict,

but such grievances are not the source of the

dispute.

Mod ern iza ti on as an Influential Var iab le in the Conflict
The changes as sociated with m od er ni za ti o n exacerbate
and promote ethnic conflict
it.

in Kurdistan,

rather than cause

The Kurds suffer from a cultural div ision of labor,

and

the economic di sparities between the people of Kurdistan and
their respective economic centers worsen the relations
between them and the Persians, Arabs,

and Turks.

Kurds

from

regions of high unemployment and little ind ustrialization
have had little to lose eco nomically by joining their
traditional leadership or the PKK against the central
governments.

E con omic oppression accounts

appeal of the Kurdish movements and,

for mu c h of the

certainly,

explains

some of the appeal of the leftist Komala and PKK.
The social structures of pre-modern Kurdistan remain
largely intact and Kurdish nationalists utilize them to

27Brass,

43.
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continue their struggles.

The PKK fights the feudal

landowners a n d the mili tia as well as the Turkish
government.

The KDPI and the Komala rely upon the support

of tribal leaders,

while the KDP and PUK,

mod ern -s o un di ng par ty names,

consist of traditional leaders.

While economic variables account
of the ethnic conflict,
modernization.

This

despite their

for important aspects

the Kurdish violence precedes

fact casts doubts ugon its influence as

the sources of the dispute.

Kurdish leaders resisted the

central authorities prior to governmental road bu il di ng and
industrialization.

In Iran and Turkey,

Kurdish revolts

began under the leadership of Ismail Agh a Simk o28 and Shayk
Said,

respectively,

before Reza Kahn and M us taf a Kemal had

even fully establ ish ed control over their state s. 29
Iraq,

In

King Faisal, who was installed as the state's first

monarch,

co mp la in ed of ethnic sentiments among the Kurds in

the Mosul region,

and said that there "is not yet an Iraq or

an Iraqi p e o p l e " 30
The conflict broke out befor e the modern states were
formed and before the differential

impact of mo de rni za tio n
i

could have af fected ethnic relations.

28See V a n Bruinessen.
29Entasser,
30Ghareeb,

12 and Izady,
2.

61.

Alt ho ugh the
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conflictual mo der ni za ti o ni st s identify and analyze economic
backwardness and economic d is pa rit y as forces that promote
persistent e t h n i c vio lence in Kurdistan,
causes.

Scholars of ethnic conflict must

these are not the
look to the

constructivist school to find the sources of the conflict.

Pr i mo rdi al ism and the Kurds
Like conflictual mod ern iz ati on ist

theory,

primordialist

theory receives a mi x ed review for its d esc ri pti on of
Kurdish ethnic conflict.

"Kurdishness" offers an example of

an identity that commands the strong,
that are prominent
However,

loyalties

in the pri mordialists discussions.

the loyalties of or dinary Kurds are not focused

upon an ethnic Kurdish nation.
understanding of the persistent,
violence,

"irrational"

A l th ou gh it enhances the
e th nic all y- mot iva te d

pr imordialist theory lacks explanations for the

initial cause of the conflict.
History has left the Kurds a legacy that is
characteristic of the stereotypes that are ou tl i ne d in
Horowitz's Ethnic Groups in C o n f l i c t .
des c ri be d them as backwards,
fiercely proud.
and rugged.31

31Izady,

Writers have

or hillbillies,

and,

yet,

They are portra ye d as independent,

Supposedly,

186 and 207

war-like

they value se lf- su ffi cie nc y and
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disdain civilization.

This type of ethnic identity is the

kind that primo rdi al ist s argue encourages powerful,
"irrational"

loyalties.

Their valued,

"backwards" ch aracteristics condition the

conflict between the Kurds and their .ethnic neighbors.
Their independent,

warrior lifestyle is re inforced by

examples of the resistance of the peshmeraa
death)
Ankara.

to the central authorities

(those who face

in Teheran,

Even the infighting among Kurds,
•

Baghdad,

and

at tri butable to

their reputation as hi llbillies with an af fin ity for
f e u d i n g , 'strengthens the "unique" qualities of
"Ku rd is hn es s, " while it weakens their a bi li ty to unite.
Kurds perceive the threat to their va lue d identity,

an

important source of pride to Kurds who have little economic
success to bolst er their collective sense of worth,
threat to themselves.
Persians, Arabs,

as a

M i li ta r y success fighting the

or Turks is a gl orification of

"Kurdishness," while economic achievement is a sign of
assimilation and submission.

Thus,

Kurdish identity has a psycholo gi cal

the defense of their
imperative that

accounts for some the destruc ti ve nature of the war and the
willingness of .the peshmeraa to sacrifice their lives.
On the other hand,

it is. questionable whet her the

psychological af fin ity for their "Kurdish"

identity is
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channelled to an unified,

ethnic Kurdistan.

Al though

Kurdish nationalists and intellectuals have pr omo te d the
concept of a single Kurdistan,

or dinary Kurds have_ given

their loyalties to their tribal leaders,
mo bi li ze d them against other Kurds.

who have often

Kurd versus Kurd

^

fighting is as b lo od y and persistent as any in the re gi on. 32
Far from a common commitment to a u ni fie d identity,
refer to greater Kurdistan as "the five parts,"
expression for the single wh ol e. 33

many

lacking an

Primordialists w ho study

the Kurdish identity m ay determine that the local Kurds
actually demonstrate

loyalty to more basi c identities,

as a Dimili or Gurani linguistic identity,

such

or memb er shi p in

the Barzani or Talabani clan.
Regardless of the operational
primordial

identities,

level of the conflicting

the existence of ps ychologically-

valued identities does not necessitate violence.
Persians,
ethnies

Arabs,

and Turks

in the region)

identities.
does not,

However,

in -itself,

ethnic groups,

The Kurds,

(to name only a few of the many

have we ll - de ve lo pe d cultural
a personal attachment to "Kurdishness"

conflict with the existence of other

such as Arabs.

Nor,

for example,

does an

attachment to "Turkishness" require aggre ssi ve nes s toward

.32Christian Science M o n i t o r . 24 Oc t obe r 1991,
33MacDonald,

237 .

5.
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Kurds.

Thus,

p r i m o r di a li sm identifies a reason for the

defense of one's identity group,

without exp lai ni ng the

beginnings of animosities between groups.
guidance from their own theory,

For lack of

the pr im ord ial is ts must rely

on the variables pr ov id ed in other theories.
The primord ial is ts and the conflictual
mo de rni za tio nis ts identify aspects of the Kurdish ethnic
conflict in Iran,

Iraq,

and Tu rke y that influence its

persiste nc e and violence.
of the ethnies

The strong,

primordial

identities

involved in the conflict and the economic

hardships that Kurds suffer account

for the animosities

between the Kurds and their neighbors,
of the fighting.

and for the intensity

These influences worsen and complicate the

ethnic conflict but did not cause it.

Co ns tr uc ti vi sm and the Kurds
The constructivists school

identifies the sources of

et hn ona tionalist vio lence in the Kurdish regions of Iran,
Iraq and Turkey.

The national self-perceptions of these

three- states excludes the Kurds from the imagined national
communities.

Simultaneously,

these states have remained

unwilling to part with their Kurdish regions and suffer
disintegration.

*6

The example of Kurdish ethnic conflict
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shows that the constructivist
conflict

interpretation of ethnic

is a key to the u nd er sta ndi ng of ethnonationalism.

In addition to discovering the source of the conflict
in the hist ory of the development of the Kurdish,
Arab,

and Turkish national identities,

school introduces
of ethnic conflict.

variables that

Persian,

the constructivist

increase the understanding

An ex amination of each relationship

between the Kurds and their respective central government
reveals how national identities and their proponents
af fected the ethnic conflict.

Exclusionary State Policies:
In Iran,

Iran.

Iraq' and Turkey

Reza Shah attempted to mol d his state after

the internationally-legitimate,

ethnical ly- ho mog eno us model,

despite the residence of a substantial number of Azeris,
Turkomen,

and Kurds in his Persi an- do min ate d state.

To

enforce his "artificially imposed Persian c o n s c i o u s n e s s , "
the Shah called upon the Society for Public Guidance,

a

police or gan ization that suppressed all non-Persian ethnies
and cultu res .34

The mon arc hy est abl is he d Persian as the

official language for its government and education system
and outlawed other languages,

34Entasser,

13.

such as Kurdish.
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Kurdish leaders and organizations resisted cultural
suppression through armed conflict,
countered with two tactics,
crushing all revolts.

but the Pahlavi mon archy

coopting landowning Kurds and

The shahs offered financial rewards

and political offices to gain the cooper ati on of Kurdish
e li te s. 35

At the same time the Iranian m i l i t a r y and the

SAVAK applied force against Kurdish nationalists.
result,

As a

the Kurdish m ov eme nt s remained u nde rg rou nd until the

Iranian Revolution in 1979,

which Kurds,

who had cooperated with the shahs,

except for those

supported.

Conditions remained harsh for Kurdish n at ion ali sm under
the Republic.

A l th ou gh its constitution re cognized the

existence of linguistic mi no rit ie s in Iran,

the Islamic

Republic only o ff ere d special status for non-Islamic,
religious mi norities

(Christian,

Jewish or Zor oa str ia n). 3e

As A ya to lla h Khomeini stated:
Sometimes the word min or iti es is used to refer to
people such as the Kurds, Lurs, Turks, Persians,
Baluchis, and such.
These peoples should not be
called minorities, beca use this term assumes that
there is a dif fer en ce between these brothers.
There is no di fferenc e between Muslims who speak
different languages, for instance, Arabs or
Persians.
It is very probable that such problems

35I b i d ., 27.
35Ib id ., 30.
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have been created by those wh o do not wish the
M u s l i m countries to be u n i t e d . 37
The Iranian government banne d the KDPI under suspicions that
they were M a r xi st -i ns pi re d and sentenced its leaders to
d e a t h .38
The universal

Islamic identity pro mot ed by the

revolut io nar y government was incompatible with the p r e 
existing secular,

cultural identity felt among the Kurds.

The Teheran government p ol it ici ze d religion as an ethnic
marker.

It d en ie d other bases of identity,

favoring the Persian ethny.

whi le implicitly

The Kurds cooperated with the

overthrow of the Shah whose Persian- ba sed nationa lis m
th re atened a Kurdish- identity.

They might have supported an

Islamic identity within which they could negotiate KurdishPersian equality.

However,

they rejected an Islamic

identity that reinforced Persian dominance.

Ethnicity had

already been po li tic ize d during the Pahlavi m o n a r c h y . 39

37Ruhallah al-Musavi al-Khomeini, Kash-f al-Asrar
(Teheran, 197 9), p. 109. in David Menashri, "Khomeini's
Policy toward Min orities," p. 216-17 in Esman and
Rabinovich.
38A threat they fulfilled when they ass assinated
Qassemlou in Vi en na in 1989.
39Hooshang Amirahmadi, "Middle-Class Revolutions in the
Third World," in Post Re vo lut ion ar y I r a n , eds. Hooshang
Ami rahmadi and Man ou ch er Parvin (Boulder, Colorado: W es tv ie w
Press, 1988), 235.
Democracy in Iran and resolution of the
Kurdish problem, according to Amirahmadi, suffers from the
legacy of suspicions aroused during the reign of the
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In Iraq,

two op posing images of the national

failed to accomm oda te the Kurdish identity.

community

Ar ab -do mi nat ed

regimes in Baghdad pro mo te d civic na ti on al is m or pan-Arab
nationalism.

Leaders,

such as Qasim,

p r o mo te d Iraq-first

policies and tried to use the Kurds to counter the Arab
nationalists.

The Ba'thists,

on the other hand,

international Ara b leadership and,

as such,

aspir ed to

vi ew ed the Kurds

as a threat to their Arab state.
Almost as if he had taken a page out of constructivist
literature,
identity.

Q a s i m w ork ed to establish an Iraqi national
Qasi m included a Kurdish sun disc

surrounded by seven red rays)

(a yellow disc

on the Iraqi nationalist

flag,

as if to invite the Kurds into the national c om mu nit y.40
The new government,

however,

ness" in the myt hical past.

could not es ta bli sh "IraqiAlso,

simple s ym bol is m lacked

the strength to overcome the Kurdish sense of Ar a b dominance
of the government.
The Arab nationalists that ousted Q as im removed the
Kurdish sun disc from the flag and ass ert ed Arab dominance
of the state.

Iraq,

for the Ba'thists,

is a secular Arab

state and the Kurds threaten and weaken it.
time,

however,

the Ba'thists dis allow the di smemberment of

Pahlavis.
40Izady,

At the same

67.
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their state.

The Kurdish region has to remain;a part of

Iraq so that Iraq can exploit

its population and resources

for the advantage of A r a b nationalism.
In Turkey,

Kurdish n a t i on al is m also grew as a

resistance to the assertion of a non-Kurdish nationalism.
Since Ataturk,

the government has b as ed its legitimacy upon

the claim of ethnic homogeneity.
existence of ethnic Kurds,
"Mountain Turks."
m i l i t a r y force.

It has denied the

cl aim in g instead the they were

A nka ra b ack ed up its insistence with
The infamous Sark Islahet Plani

Reforms in the East)

{Plan for

placed the region under m il i t a r y rule,

forcibly relocated Kurds and d e n i e d them employment
civil se rvi ce. 41
Kurdish language.

The plan outlawed the public use of the
Al tho ug h the police enf orced the

prohibi ti on only fitfully,
the government

in the

de pen din g on the di sposition of

in Ankara and local officials,

Kurdish

nationalists chaffed under the res tr i ct io ns .42
Through its tactics,
PKK.

In 1984,

the government stren gth en ed the

the PKK consisted of only 200 fighters and

enjo ye d little popu lar support.
of Lebanon,

Based in the Beka'a V all ey

it relied on Syria for support and was

essent ia lly a fo rei gn -subsidized terrorist group.

41Ma.ngo,

983.

42Ib id. , 982.

By 1993,
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15.000 battle-hardened,

we ll -a rme d PKK guerrillas fought

from their mou nt a in strongholds and enjo yed the support of
375.000 s y m p a th iz er s. 43
ambassador to Turkey,

Eric Rouleau,

the former French

comments:

The surge wi tn es se d by the PKK cannot be explained
by either its Mar xi st -L en in is t ideology, which is
alien to the local mentality, or its ultimate goal
of e st ab l is hi ng an independent st a te —
a goal the
maj o ri ty of the Kurdish po pu la ti o n does not sh ar e.44
The hard-line PKK grew after the government

suppressed

moderat e nationalists.
During the 1990 Newroz celebrations,
decisive change in tactics.
rural villages

the PKK made a

It shifted its efforts from

to urban centers where mass demonstrations

were organized.

The battle for local sympathy was won and

the PKK enco ura ged popular resistance to security forces and
the militia.
comment:

Journalist Aliz a Marcus records a local

"PKK comes to talk to us.

It's the government,

the

soldiers we are afraid of because they don't t a l k — they
kill."45

Prime M i ni st e r Turgot Ozal respo nde d to the PKK

threat by g r a nt in g br oa d powers to the regional governors to
exile citizens,

43Rouleau,

evacuate villages,

and censor the press.

124.

44Ib id ., 125.
45Christian Science M o n i t o r . 30 Au gust

1990,

10.
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Having grown rapidly in numbers and popularity,

the PKK

was able to take advantage of the Gulf Wa r and the
subsequent creation of a no -fly zone in northern Iraq.
could attack bases
land of Iraq.

in T ur ke y and then flee into the no-man's

The government allied with the leaders of the

Kurdish Federated State and launched attacks
region,

They

into the

but has yet to end PKK resistance.

Kurdish e t h n on at io na li sm in Iran,
reaction to Persian,

Arab,

Iraq,

and Tu r ke y is a

and Turkish na t io na l is m and not

the result of uneven modernization.

Kurdish moveme nts arose

in resistance to the state-building efforts of the dominant
groups

in their states.

Economic di spa ri ty increases the

inter-ethnic animosities that have res ulted from the
as sertion of a Kurdish

identity that conflicts with the

dominant identities of the three states.
While the problems among the Kurds is an identity
crisis,

it is not a simple m at te r of four strong ethnic

identities which are incompatible.
Arab,

The Kurdish,

Persian,

and Turkish identities can each trace their roots far

into the primordial past.

Nonetheless,

Kurdish,

Turkish,

and A r a b groups did not experience per sistent ethnic
violence under Ottoman rule.

The conflicts b et wee n the

Kurds and the other ethnies results from the inability or
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unwillingness of the states to create national identities
that include their Kurdish minorities.
In addition to addressing the cause of Kurdish ethnic
violence,

constructivist theory introduces a dimension that

is ignored by the conflictual m od e rn iz ati on ist s and the
primordialists.

Construct iv ist s ask: What barriers prevent

the formation of a Kurdish national identity?

This question

confronts the forces that keep the Kurds apart and allow the
governments in Teheran,

Baghdad,

and A nka ra to use them

against each other.

The Qu estion of a Kurdish National
Linguistic,

regional,

Identity

and religious differences among

the Kurds cast doubt upon the li kelihood of the creation of
an identity capable of uniting the Kurds and their
nationalist movements.
a common religion,.

The Kurds lack a common language and

Furthermore re gi ona lis m and political

differences among the Kurds undermine their attempts to
nurture loyalties to a greater Kurdi sh nation and
nationalist movement.
The Kurdish language is d iv i d e d into numerous dialects.
Several of these dialects might b ett er be catego riz ed as
separate languages within a language group,

because they are
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only as similar to one another as French is to Italian.46
The powerful states that divide the Kurds have prevented
Kurdish-speakers from dev eloping some form of a lingua
franca.

Lin gui st ic differ ences have inhibited the formation

of a common Kurdish

identity.

Lacking a ce ntralized Kurdish

state to standardize their diverse linguistic heritage,
Kurds must base their nat ionhood upon anoth er source.
Likewise,

religious differences among the Kurds hinder

national un it y. 47

Most Kurds are Sunni Muslims,

significant number are also Shia Muslims,
Yazidis.

but a

Alawites,

and

Kurdish religious communities are often divided

along linguistic lines.

Kurds ex perience the divisions

between the Sunni and Shi'a communities.

Additionally,

the

heretical Al aw i te s and Yazidis w ith in their communities
divide the Kurds among themselves,

as well as worsening

relations with pre do m in an tl y Sunni Turks,
Sunni Arabs,
Finally,

and the Shi'a m a jo ri ty in Iran.
the Kurds suffer from reg io nal ism and a

po li tic al ly d iv ide d leadership.

46Izady,

pr edo mi na nt ly

The Kurds lack unity from

170.

47Van Bruinessen argues that traditional and religious
structures offer ed the most promise for un ifi cat io n of the
Kurds at least until the 1950's.
Until then, all ma jor
revolts were led by the shayks, whose po sition as holy men
pro vi ded them the autho rit y to uni fy enough tribes to resist
the central authorities.
Van Bruinessen, 371.

one region to another.

Even within each of the five states

into which geopolitical

forces have divided them,

exists factionalism.

The political

state fight each other,
governments,

there

leaders within each

their respective central

as well as the Kurdish movements in other

states.
Kurds wi thin each individual state disagree upon a
single leadership even for that region.

In Iran,

the

leftist Komala has engaged in b loo dy struggles against the
liberal KDPI,
both.

even while government

forces tried to destroy

The two Kurdish groups in Iraq,

the KDP an d the PUK,

h a v e .recently united to form the Kurdish Federated State,
but have fought feuds in the past.

Talabani's PUK even ^

allied with Saddam Hussein against their KDP ethnic
brothers.
joining,

In Turkey,

although some are coerced into

ma n y Kurds join the Ank ar a - ba ck ed mili tia against

the rebel PKK.
The Kurds are aliena te d from the dominant cultures of
their states by their ethnic identity and,
with one another.

not unified

Cultu ra lly and linguistically,

distinct from the Persians, Arabs,
identity is associated,
most of Kurdistan,

yet,

and Turks.

they are

Thus,

Kurdish

as has been the situation throughout

with the support of local clan- and tribal

leaders who fight among themselves,

or the Kurdish identity
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is linked to the support of modern nationalist movements
like the PKK, with its alien M arxist

ide ology and whose

primar y appeal comes from its armed resistance to the
Turkish government.
The question of a Kurdish national identity,
by the constructivists,

suggested

points to the value of

co nst ructivism as an approach to ethnonationalism.

The

conflictual. modern'izationist approach is too ahistorical and
focused upon ec onomic variables to illuminate this crucial
aspect of Kurdish ethnonationalism.

The primordialists

begin to address the importance of identity,

but stop after

examining the psy cho lo gic al appeal of ethnic identity.
Constructivist

literature opens up the researcher's mi n d to

the role of the argumen tat ive creation of identities in
ethnic conflict.

Summary
Modern Kurdish et hn ona tio na lis m grew as a response to
others'

efforts at nation-building.

As Reza Shah and

Must af a Kemal en forced the dominance of Persian and Turkish
identities upon their multi -et hn ic states,

Kurdish leaders

resisted the expansion of central a uth or ity as well as the
suppression of Kurdish culture.

Similarly,

the Arab-

dominated state of Iraq alienated its Kurdish minority.
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Whether A r a b nationalists or others controlled Baghdad,
Iraqi governments v ie wed the Kurds as a threat to their
newly formed state.

All three states att acked any

expressions of "Kurdishness."
'State suppression and Kurdish resistance created a
cycle of violence that persists.

Kurdish leaders m ob il ize d

their followers aroun d ethnic identity,

claiming that

d isc rim in ato ry policies and eco nomic oppression justified
their cause.

Ordinary Kurds remained genera lly loyal to

their traditional leaders and supported their defense of
their valued identity against threat of the state.
their part,

For

the central governments saw Kurdish rebellions

as justification for the suppression of the dis int egrating
threat of the Kurdish identity.
In this light,

the economic disparity between the Kurds

and their economic centers is best seen as an outcome of
culture- bas ed exclusion from the national community,
as the source of the violence.
Kurdish regions of Iran,

Iraq,

and not

The failure to mo der ni ze
and Turkey indicates the

frustration of the central authorities.

Economic

development of Kurdistan could very well enhance the
strength of an ethny.that has,

for the large part,

resisted

assimilation and d em on str ate d disloyalty.

The sense of a

"colonial"

Baghdad,

rule over Kurdistan by Teheran,

and
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A nk ara worsens ethnic relations and complicates the
resolution of the conflict,

but d id not cause the conflict.

Constructivist theory addresses the important issues of
the likelihood of Kurdish a ss imi la tio n within the three
Middle Eastern states or the formation of a Kurdish national
identity.

Kurds,

esp eci al ly since they are we ll -ar me d and

mo bi liz ed along ethnic lines,

are unlikel y to accept the

legitimacy of a Iraq under the guise of an Ar a b identity or
a Turkey under the guise of a Turkish identity.

Similarly,

they are un li k el y to accept a pa n- Is la mic identity in Iran
that favors the status-quo of Persian dominance.
same time,

At the

the obstacles to the construction of a Kurdish

national identity have allowed the central governments to
divide and suppress their Kurdish minorities^

C H A P T E R VIII
CO NCLUSION

Together,

the conflictual m o d e r n i z a t i o n i s t , the

primordialist and the constructivist

schools offer

approaches that enhance the understan di ng of the ethnic
violence between the Kurds and the Persians,
Turks.

Arabs,

and •

Each identifies variables that influence the

creation of ethnic identities,
along ethnic lines,

the reasons for conflict

the pe rs ist en ce of conflict,

or the

irrational destructiveness of the violence in the Kurdish
regions of Iran,

Iraq and Turkey.

However,

the

constructivist approach reveals the original causes of the
ethnic conflict and introduces attempts to construct nations
as considerations in the ethnic conflict debate.

Therefore,

constructivist considerations must be acc o un te d for in
future studies of ethnic conflicts.
The de pendency theorists of the conflictual
moderni zat ion is t

school prov ide a model of. regional economic

different iat ion for the study of ethnic violence.
the peripheries of Iran,

Iraq,

Kurds

in

and Turkey lack m a n y of the

ma ter ial goods that mo de rn it y has brought to those states.
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Additionally,
Kurdistan's

they sense that the "centers" have exploited

laborers and natural resources

of the dominant ethnies.

for the benefit

Kurdish nationalists complain that

their people suffer from economic oppression under the rule
of non-Kurds.
However,

the dep endency theorists

role of ethnic elites in the conflict,

fail to address the
other than to suggest

that they might argue for economic eq uality for ethnic
groups.

This ignores ethnonat io nal is t demands for cultural

rights and autonomy.

Other than identifying a source of

grievance between the Kurds and the ethnies in the economic
centers,

the competition theorists add little to the

understanding of the ethnic violence.
Other conflictual m od er ni zat io nis ts argue that the
destruction of t r a d i t i o n a l .order and elite attempts to gain
power in the exp an ded polity causes ethnic conflict.

The

mi no r attempts to moder niz e Kurdistan have threatened some
Kurdish elites,

but the most

important

impact of

moderniz at ion upon the vi olence in Kurdistan has been the
introduction of the ideology of nationalism.
Kurds,

Persians,

Arabs,

Leaders of the

and Turks learned the language of

national is m to argue for their respective group's right to
nationhood.

History denied the Kurds their own nation,

placing them under the state author ity of other ethnies.
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The primord ial is ts examine the psy cho log ic al aspects of
ethnic identities to un derstand ethnic conflicts.
perspective,

From this

the Kurds offer an example of a strong identity

that commands t h e .psy ch olo gic al devotion of its members.
Traits ass oci at ed with the Kurds dictate wa r- li ke behavior,
disdain for ci vil ization and,
prejudices,

even,

infighting.

These

which have roots in the subconsciences of Kurds

and non-Kurds,

increase the likelihood of vio lence and

mi li tat e against the assimilation of t he Kurdish identity.
However,

the existence of strong ethnic identities

the likelihood of violence,

increases

but does not necessitate

conflict with other establ ish ed identities.
The example of Kurdish et hno na t io na l is m demonstrates
the advantages of including the constructivist approach and
its questions to the study of an ethnic conflict.

The focus

of the constructivists upon the factors involved in creating
national identities reveals the initial causes of the
conflicts between the Kurds and the Persians,
the Turks,

as well as illuminating the dif fi culties

establishing a Kurdish national
In Iran,

and

in

identity.

the shahs enforced the ethnically-homogenous,

French national m o d e l . , Ethnic minorities,
Kurds,

the Arabs,

such as the

that resisted Persian dominance th r ea t en ed the

mon archy's legitimacy and h ad to be suppressed.

The violent
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tactics of the government p o l i t i ci ze d ethnicity in Iran and,
when the Iranian revolutionaries o ve rt hre w the Pahlavis,
Islamic Republic could not allay Kurdish suspicions

the

that a

pan-Isla mi c state was just anot her m eth od of contin ued
Persian dominance.

Furthermore,

the secular pr in ciples of

the Kurdish nationalists con tr ast ed with the new regime's
religious ideologies.

Vi ole nce an d oppression contin ue d as

they had during the monarchy.
In I r a q , .the Kurds pr es en te d the greatest threat to
their respective state.

Iraqi leaders could .neither abide ^

the threat of armed Kurds within their state,
Kurds,

annihilate the

nor accept the dismembe rm ent of their state.

The

Kurds and Baghdad al ternated bet wee n open violence,
rebellious Kurds seeking outside support from Iran o r the
Un it ed States and the government allying with other Kurdish
leaders,

and armed peace while the government consolidated

its power and the Kurds feuded among themselves.
The Turkish government chose to declare itself an
ethnic Turkish Republic that exc lu d ed Kurds from thev-"
national community.

Mi lit ary and educational policies

attem pt ed to enforce an alternative

"Mountain Turk" identity

upon Kurds within the borders of the republic,
policy backfired..

but the

The Turkish government kept a tight reign

upon Kurdish intellectuals and nationalists until the PKK

grew large enough to oppose it.

Decades of bruta lit y

against residents of Kurdistan c re ate d animosities that fuel
the Kurdish nationalist movement.
Alt hou gh Kurds
linguistic,

resist their respective government,

religious,

and political differences divide

their nationalist movements.
Kurdish nation,

If there was an independent

one must ask which of the mutual ly-

incomprehensible Kurdish dialects woul d be the official
language for government and education.

The divided Kurds

would have to decide within which guerr ill a organization's
region the capital would lie.

They must determine whether

t h e _form of gov er nm en t would be a liberal republic along the
lines of the KDPI's desires,

one that respected the

authority of the powerful clans as the KDP or PUK might
wish,

or a m ode rn socialist or communist government favored

by the PKK and Komala.

These are all questions that the

founders of an independent Kurdistan wo u ld have to address
prior to the first negotiations among the feuding leaders.
Co n st ru ct ivi sm introduces an important va ria bl e into
the study of ethnic violence that is ignored in the
conflictual mo der ni zat ion is t and the pr imo rdi al ist accounts
of ethnic conflicts.

Con st ructivism takes the ideological

and argumentative aspects of ethnicity and n a ti on ali sm
seriously.

Though the claims and demands of
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ethnonationalists,
separatism,
motives,

w he the r they call for patriotism,

or autonomy,

should not be taken as their honest

neither should they be ignored as meaningless.

Demands for cultural autonomy or linguistic rights should be
taken at face value.
Conflictual mod er ni za ti o ni st s assume that ethnic
conflicts result from the social disturbance of
m od er niz at ion o r the interest politics of elites who seek
power or economic rewards.

Identity is me r e l y a convenient

tool around which nonelites mo re readily mobilize.
for cultural preservation,
rights,

therefore,

cultural autonomy,

Demands

and linguistic

are a ruse to ma sk political and economic

interests.
Primordialists assume that ethnic identities are
persistent remnants of a bygone era.

Ethnicity holds a

subconscious meani ng to individuals and has proven its
psychological value as a m e c h a n i s m of social unity.

Members

will sacrifice self interests and even their lives for the
g r o u p ’s status and protection.
ethnic nationalists,

However,

the demands of

no ma t t e r how hon estly felt,

represent irrational attachments and,

thus,

simply

are not to be

taken seriously.
Scholars should take serious the desires of ethnic
elites and nonelites for linguistic and cultural rights.

To
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consider them as me chanis ms of m an ip ul a ti on or remnants of
prehistoric society misses the imagined and constructed
nature of nations.

Qasim's flag with the Kurdish sun disc,

its subsequent removal,

and the T ur ki sh government's arrest

and torture of Mo us sa Ant er for authoring a Kurdish
dictionary show the importance of these
seek to standardize "their"
history,

language,

issues.

or writ e

When Kurds
"their"

or even when they outline thd borders of

"Kurdistan" on maps,

they construct a nation where presen tl y

clan loyalties and fac tionalism persist.

Theorists should

not hide from these issues behind as sumptions that
nationalists do not unde rst an d their real grievances.
Given its usefulness as an analytical tool of the
ethnic conflict

in Kurdistan,

con st r uc ti vi sm should be

applied in future studies of this phenomenon.

In addition

to the questions raised by the other approaches,

further

studies should ask if the states exper ien cin g ethnic
violence have p r om ot ed a national, communi ty that is
inclusive to all significant,
should examine the means
identities,

potential

identities.

They

for fostering regionally-based

since nation-states are better defined as

regions under a state's control,

rather than as ethnic

nations under a state's control.

For specific cases,

political scientists should ask,

given past state policies,
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what is the likelihood of finding an identity with universal
appeal.

The answe r to the world wi de reduction of ethnic

conflict depends upon wh et he r the West,
the eth nic ally-homogenous

which has promoted

state as both m od er n and ideal,

can pea cefully change the international
the standard change incrementally,

standard,

or must

through violence.
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